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I. THE VULNERABLE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN SOCIETY
In the developed world at the beginning of the twenty-first century, life is built
upon computerized databases. Those electronic troves contain a vast range of
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1.   “Credit card transactions, magazine subscriptions, telephone numbers, real estate records,
automobile registrations, consumer surveys, warranty registrations, credit reports, and Internet web sites
are all sources of personal information . . . .” Database Security Breach Notification Law, ch. 51,
§ 3072, 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at LA LEGIS 499 (2005) (Westlaw). “[B]usinesses
and governments share everything from marketing lists to property records on the Internet.” CR
Investigates:  Stop Thieves from Stealing You, CONSUMER REP., Oct. 2003, at 12 [hereinafter Stop
Thieves].
2.  Identity Theft Resource Center Reports 104 Security Breaches Since January 1st; Is Anyone
Hearing an Alarm Bell Yet?, PR NEWSWIRE, Sept. 6, 2005, http://sev.prnewswire.com/computer-
electronics/20050906/CLTU03406092005-1.html.
3.  According to one source, “hacker” means an “[u]nauthorized user who attempts to or gains
access to an information system and the data it supports.” KeyBank, Information Security Terms
Glossary, http://www.key.com/html/A-11.2.1.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005). See also Eric J. Sinrod
& William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes:  A Practical Approach to the Application of Federal Computer
Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 181–83 (2000) (discussing “hackers”
and “crackers,” the latter being hackers with criminal intent). In this Article, unless context indicates
otherwise, the term “hacker” means an “outside” unauthorized user.  “One of the greatest threats to the
security of client computers is not the hacker, but the enemy within:  trusted company employees,
ex-employees, consultants, or other insiders familiar with the computer network.” Michael L. Rustad,
Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 76
(2001). The term “data intruder” as used herein encompasses both hackers and insiders without
authorization to access data at the time, or for the purposes, that the person attempts to gain access.
States have passed security breach notification laws, discussed in Parts II.B.2 and III.A, to respond
to the risks of harm that hackers and other intruders create. Application of these laws frequently pivots
on the definition of “security breach.” See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d) (West Supp. 2005)
(defining a breach of security of a database as an “unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that
compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal information maintained by the person
or business”). This Article sometimes uses the terms data intrusion and security breach synonymously.
4.  See generally R. Bradley McMahon, Note, After Billions Spent to Comply with HIPAA and
GLBA Privacy Provisions, Why Is Identity Theft the Most Prevalent Crime in America?, 49 VILL. L.
REV. 625, 627–29 (2004) (discussing how identity theft occurs); Anthony E. White, Comment, The
Recognition of a Negligence Cause of Action for Victims of Identity Theft:  Someone Stole My Identity,
Now Who Is Going to Pay for It?, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 847, 851–52 (2005) (discussing “account
information about virtually all persons who interact (voluntarily or involuntarily)
with the institutions of society. A myriad of entities—including businesses, non-
profit organizations, and the government—assemble, update, manage, and use
masses of computerized information relating to individuals.1 The data often
includes, but certainly is not limited to  names, relationships (e.g., family members
and employers), contact information (e.g., phone numbers, residences, and virtual
addresses), personal histories (e.g., birth dates, medical data, physical
characteristics, and educational records), official identifiers (e.g., social security,
driver’s license, and passport numbers), and financial records (e.g., bank, credit
card, frequent flyer, and investment account numbers).2 Without these databases,
virtually all types of enterprises would operate much less efficiently than they do
today.
When an unauthorized user hacks or otherwise improperly accesses information
contained in computerized databases,3 the consequences can be devastating for the
persons to whom the information relates (data subjects). Among the more obvious
risks is the possibility that an affected individual will become a victim of identity
theft4 and will suffer ruinous losses to credit and reputation,5 emotional distress,6
2005] CYBERSECURITY 257
takeovers” and “true name fraud”); FED. TRADE COMM’N, NATIONAL AND STATE TRENDS IN FRAUD &
IDENTITY THEFT: JANUARY-DECEMBER 2004 (2005), available at http://www.consumer.gov/
sentinel/pubs/Top10Fraud2004.pdf (gathering statistics); Tom Zeller, Jr., Identity Crises, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 2005, at C1 (stating that “[a]bout 10 million Americans fall victim each year to identity theft”
and that “in about a third of those cases . . . private information is used by thieves to open new accounts,
secure loans and otherwise lead parallel and often luxurious lives”).
5.  See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 847–48 (discussing a scenario wherein a husband and wife
suffer a loss to their credit and reputation).
6.  See, e.g., Timothy H. Skinner, California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act:  The
First State Breach Notification Law Is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft
Legislation, 10 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, ¶ 12 (2003), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v10i1/article1.pdf
(listing emotional distress as a consequence of identity theft).
7.  SENATE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. C.S.S.B. 122, 79th Leg., R.S.
(2005), available at TX. B. An., S.B. 122, 4/7/2005 (Westlaw) (reporting that “[v]ictims spend an
average of 600 hours over two to four years and $1,400 to clear their names”).
8.  Be Aware and Beware of Identity Theft, FDA CONSUMER, July-Aug. 2005, available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/departs/2005/405_fda.html (stating that as a result of identity theft, “victims
may lose job opportunities; may be refused loans, education, housing, or cars; or may even be arrested
for crimes they didn’t commit”) [hereinafter FDA CONSUMER]. For example, a hacker may be able to
access an admissions application, change the data submitted online, and thereby reduce the applicant’s
chances of being accepted. Cf. Robert Lemos, USC Admissions Site Cracked Wide Open, THE
REGISTER, July 6, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/07/06/usc_site_cracked/print.html
(discussing a flaw in a university application system that “left the personal information of users publicly
accessible”); Reuters, Colleges Struggle to Combat Identity Thieves, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 21, 2005,
at A19 (stating that “universities may rival financial institutions as attractive targets”).
9.  See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 3, at 63 (reporting that “[a] former chemistry graduate student
found a security flaw in a commercial website and demanded ransom payments to keep quiet about it”).
10.  Cf. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003) (discussing the liability of an
online investigation service that sold a victim’s personal information to her killer). For a discussion of
Remsburg, see infra text accompanying note 263.
11.  Rustad, supra note 3, at 65.
12.  Cf. Zeller, supra note 4, at C1 (stating that “some experts have suggested that consumers are
much more likely to fall victim to a rogue employee—at a doctor’s office, say, or a collection
agency—than to a gang of hackers infiltrating a database”).
inconvenience, out-of-pocket expenses,7 and perhaps even lost opportunities.8 In
more extreme cases, the individual to whom the information pertains may be
blackmailed,9 stalked by an assailant, or physically harmed.10 The sources of
unauthorized data access are diverse. “The perpetrators of computer intrusions may
be bored juveniles, disgruntled employees, corporate spies, or organized crime
networks,”11 not to mention run-of-the-mill thieves.12 
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13.  See, e.g., John C. Ensslin, 2 CU Computers Hacked; Security Breaches Expose Personal Data
on 42,900 Students, Faculty and Staff, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, July 22, 2005, at 22A (discussing security
breaches at the University of Colorado that exposed the personal data of 42,900 students, faculty, and
staff members); University to Warn of Web Security Breach, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 21
(discussing plans by the University of Southern California to notify 270,000 persons that hacking
occurred); Ellen Yan, Breach of Security Personal Information of More Than 300 CUNY Law Students
who Received College Loans was Online, Including Bank Information, NEWSDAY, Sept. 27, 2005, at
A03 (stating that the “Social Security numbers and other sensitive information belonging to more than
300 CUNY Law School students were accidentally posted on the Internet”); see also DELOITTE, 2004
GLOBAL SECURITY SURVEY 14, 22 (2004), available at http://www.deloitte.net/dtt/cda/doc/content/
dtt_financialservices_SecuritySurvey2004_051704.pdf (reporting that a survey of major global financial
institutions revealed that 83% reported a breach of computer security during the last year, and that while
“outside intrusions were more common than those from the inside[], the majority of respondents have
experienced both”).
14.  Cf. SENATE RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, Cal. A.B. 700, 2001-2002 R.S. (2002), available
at CA B. An., A.B. 700 Sen., 8/22/2002 (Westlaw) (reporting that “computer hackers were able to
illegally access sensitive financial and personal information, including Social Security numbers, of
approximately 265,000 state workers”); Eric Dash, Europe Zips Lips; U.S. Sells ZIPS, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7, 2005, § 4, at 1 (stating that, in 2005, “the personal information of more than 50 million consumers
has been lost, stolen and even sold to thieves”); Eric Dash, From Data Holders, Lots of Reassurance,
N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at C6 (indicating that Bank of America reported in February 2005 “that it
had lost data tapes containing millions of its customers’ records”); Melissa Sanchez, Breach Exposes
School Records, STAR-TELEGRAM (Fort Worth, Tex.), Aug. 9, 2005 (discussing a breach of security at
the University of North Texas compromised data relating to more than 38,000 present, former, and
prospective students); Lemos, supra note 8 (discussing a flaw in an online university application system
that “put at risk ‘hundreds of thousands’ of records containing personal information”).
15.  See David B. Reddick, Security Breach Notification Laws:  What Threats Do They Pose for
Insurers?, ISSUE BRIEF (Nat’l Ass’n of Mutual Ins. Cos., Indianapolis, Ind.), July 7, 2005, at 2
(indicating that during a recent year more than 10 million persons were victims of identity theft, which
“topped the FTC’s annual complaints list for the fifth year in a row”), available at
http://www.namic.org/insbriefs/050707SecurityBreach.pdf.
16.  See Jason Krause, The Case of the Ethical Hacker:  U.S. Request for Reversal Raises
Questions About Use of Computer Fraud Law, A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Nov. 7, 2003 (discussing criminal
liability under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Federal
Jury Convicts Smart-Card Hacker for Violating Digital Millennium Copyright Act (Sept. 22, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/whiteheadConviction.htm (discussing the first hacker
conviction under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act); Ex-Student Sentenced in UT Computer
Hacking, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 7, 2005, at 2B (discussing a former student sentenced
to five years of probation and ordered to pay over $170,000 in restitution); see also CRITICAL
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION AND THE LAW:  AN OVERVIEW OF KEY ISSUES 37–39
(Stewart D. Personick ed., 2003), available at http://books.nap.edu/html/ciip/index.html [hereinafter
CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE] (briefly discussing the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, and the USA Patriot Act, as well as fraud in
connection with “access devices” and interception of communications); Brent Wible, A Site Where
Hackers Are Welcome:  Using Hack-In Contests to Shape Preferences and Deter Computer Crime, 112
YALE L.J. 1577, 1581–85 (2003) (discussing computer crime involving unwarranted intrusions into
private computer networks). Hackers who misuse improperly accessed personal information may also
be subject to liability under the identity theft laws. See, e.g., White, supra note 4, at 856 (indicating that
forty-four states have identity theft statutes and that, in 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and
News reports about hacking are now common.13 Such breaches of data security
often threaten the interests of hundreds or thousands of persons simultaneously.14
Because database use is ubiquitous, virtually everyone is a potential victim.15
Hackers and other data intruders are subject to criminal16 and civil liability.17
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Deterrence Act).
17.  See Rustad, supra note 3, at 66 (predicting that “[t]ort remedies . . . will play an increasingly
important role in punishing and deterring fraud, hacking, and other wrongdoing on the Internet”).
18.  See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag:  An Empirical
Analysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 85 (2003) (stating that “[h]ardly a day goes by without new
media reports of cyberspace wrongs, yet plaintiff victories remain rare”). Whether hackers have a duty
to mitigate or avoid liability is a subject of debate. According to “the main principles of
hacking[,] . . . information should circulate as widely as possible.” Nicholas Thompson, Who Needs
Keys? Hackers Learn How to Trespass the Old-Fashioned Way—From a Lockpicker, LEGAL AFF.,
Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 8, 8: see also Wible, supra note 16, at 1589–92 (discussing the transformation of
hacker culture and stressing the need to “rebuild a community of hackers in which a body of positive
social norms can be sustained”); Krause, supra note 16 (stating that “[o]ne of the activities that defines
the hacker community is the process of looking for software security holes and publishing details of
security flaws on the Web. . . .  Some argue this research is a kind of peer review that is vital to
computer science”).
19.  See, e.g., Rustad, supra note 3, at 114 (opining that “a virus that destroys a hard drive might
be conceptualized as the tort of conversion”).
20.  See id. at 106 (stating that “[c]ourts have held that a hacker’s intrusion into a computer
network constitutes a trespass to chattels”).
21.  See Shannon Duffy, Law Firm Accused of Hacking, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 14, 2005,
at 1, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ltn/pubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1121245509109 (discussing a suit
against a law firm for “copyright infringement, civil conspiracy, trespass to chattels, trespass for
conversion, and intrusion upon seclusion”).
22.  18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2000) (stating in part that “[a]ny person who suffers damage . . . may
maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctive relief or
other equitable relief”); see generally Rustad, supra note 3, at 89–91 (describing the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act).
23.  See, e.g,, Ensslin, supra note 13 (discussing attacks traced to France and Eastern Europe);
Rustad, supra note 3, at 74 (stating that the “Russian Republics have been a popular venue for
innovative cyberscams involving credit card numbers stolen from websites”); SENATE RULES COMM.,
BILL ANALYSIS, Cal. A.B. 700, 2001-2002 R.S. (2002), available at CA B. An., A.B. 700 Sen.,
8/22/2002 (Westlaw) (discussing access of hacked data by “unauthorized persons in Germany”).
24.  See Wible, supra note 16, at 1582 (asserting that “hackers tend to be judgment proof”).
Victims may sue, sometimes successfully,18 under a variety of tort theories,
including conversion,19 trespass to chattels,20 and intrusion upon private affairs,21
as well as under the civil liability provisions of the federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act.22 However, hackers, particularly those located in other countries,23 may
be difficult to identify or subject to jurisdiction. Hackers may also be judgment-
proof.24 A better target for a lawsuit—one easier to locate, more amenable to legal
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25.  There is an important initial terminological question relating to cybersecurity tort liability:
if there is a duty of care and a risk of liability, on whom should the duty and risk be imposed? Should
the analysis focus on the obligations of database owners, database possessors, or some other class of
persons? This Article speaks in terms of the duty and liability of database “possessors” on the
assumption that a party in possession of data has the opportunity to exercise care. The term would
include owners or licensees in possession of data and perhaps others. The determination to focus on
possession of data finds analogical support in the law of premises liability that generally imposes duties
and liability on the party in possession of the premises at the time the harm occurred. For example, a
lessor not in possession of a leased premises is subject to only limited liability in many states. See, e.g.,
Clauson v. Kempffer, 477 N.W.2d 257, 261 (S.D. 1991) (holding that a landlord had no duty to warn
a motorcyclist of a smooth wire fence that tenants had strung across a road on a leased premises).
However, a legislature or court might elect to speak in other terms. State security breach notification
statutes generally only require data owners or licensors to notify data subjects that unauthorized access
to data has occurred. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.81.5–.82 (West Supp. 2005) (imposing
obligations on a “business that owns or licenses personal information”); Act effective July 1, 2005, ch.
473, sec. 1, §§ 47-18-2107(a)(2), -2107(b), 2005-2 Tenn. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 749, 749-50
(LexisNexis) (imposing a notification duty on an “information holder,” which includes “any person or
business that conducts business in this state, or any agency of the State of Tennessee or any of its
political subdivisions”). State security breach notification laws generally oblige database possessors
who do not own the breached data to disclose the intrusion to the owner of the data, rather than the data
subject. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(b) (West Supp. 2005) (stating that “[a]ny person or
business that maintains computerized data that includes personal information that the person or business
does not own shall notify the owner or licensee of the information of any breach of the security of the
data immediately following discovery, if the personal information was, or is reasonably believed to have
been, acquired by an unauthorized person”).
26.  See Robert Steinberg, Advising Clients About Hacker Insurance, LOS ANGELES LAW., Feb.
2003, at 60, 60 (“For corporations with well-known brand names, in high visibility industries, with
significant Web presences, or sensitive information, a single breach, with the potential for third-party
claims, can be financially devastating.”); see also Ethan Preston & Paul Turner, The Global Rise of a
Duty to Disclose Information Security Breaches, 22 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 457, 491
(2004) (“One study found that publicly-traded firms which disclosed security breaches lost 2.1% of their
market value within two days of the disclosure.”).
process, and perhaps more solvent—may be the database possessor25 who failed to
prevent or reveal the security breach, rather than the intruder.
Whether, and to what extent, courts can hold a database possessor liable for
damages suffered by data subjects as a result of improper data access are questions
of huge importance. On one hand, unless the courts impose some form of liability,
the persons often in the best position to prevent the losses may have insufficient
incentive to exercise care to avoid unnecessary harm. On the other hand, if liability
is too readily assessed, it will have the power to bankrupt valuable enterprises
because of the often vast numbers of potential plaintiffs and consequent extensive
resulting damages.26 Obviously, courts must strike a balance that adequately
protects the interests of individuals without discouraging the use of computer
technology or driving important institutions out of existence.
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27.  See, e.g., Complaint at 2–3, Parke v. Cardsystems Solutions, Inc., No. CGC-05-442624 (Cal.
Super. Ct. filed June 27, 2005) (alleging, in a class action, that hackers accessed information relating
to forty million credit card accounts and that the defendants had failed to protect the data or promptly
notify data subjects about the breach); Class Action Complaint, Goldberg v. ChoicePoint, Inc., No.
BC329115 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb. 18, 2005) (alleging, in a class action involving 145,000 persons,
that the defendants failed to protect personal data, failed to promptly notify data subjects of the breach,
engaged in unfair business practices, and committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation); see also
Laura Mahoney, Identity Theft:  Class Action Filed Against ChoicePoint as AG Launches Investigation
into Breach, 6 COMPUTER TECH. L. REP. 107 (2005) (indicating that the state was “tracking about 45
cases that have been significant in size”).
28.  See Jane Strachan, Cybersecurity Obligations, 20 ME. B.J. 90 (2005) (discussing how to
advise business clients in light of “[t]oday’s . . . risk of a lawsuit or regulatory enforcement arising from
inadequate information security practices”).
29.  See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-101 to -108 (Supp. 2005); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.80–.84
(West Supp. 2005); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-910 to -912 (Supp. 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-
115(5) (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-30-01 to -07 (Supp. 2005); Act of June 24, 2005, Pub. Act 05-
148, §§ 1-3, 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv. (West), available at CT LEGIS P.A. 05-148 (Westlaw); Act of
June 28, 2005, Pub. Act 61, sec. 1, §§ 12B-101 to -104, 2005 Del. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv.
(LexisNexis), available at 2005 Del. ALS 61 (LexisNexis); Act of June 14, 2005, ch. 2005-229, sec.
1-3, §§ 817.568-.5681, 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at FL LEGIS 2005-229 (Westlaw);
Personal Information Protection Act, Pub. Act 94-36, ch. 815, sec. 530, 2005 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West),
available at IL LEGIS 94-36 (2005) (Westlaw); Act effective July 1, 2005, Pub. L. No. 91-2005, ch.
11, sec. 2, §§ 4-1-11-1 to -9, 2005 Ind. Legis. Serv. (West), available at IN LEGIS 91-2005 (2005)
(Westlaw); Database Security Breach Notification Law, ch. 51, §§ 3071 to -3077, 2005 La. Sess. Law
Serv. (West), available at LA LEGIS 499 (2005) (Westlaw); Notice of Risk to Personal Data Act, ch.
379, sec. 1, §§ 1346 to -1349, 2005 Me. Legis. Serv. (West), available at ME LEGIS 379 (2005)
(Westlaw); Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 167, sec. 1, §§ 1 to -6, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West),
available at MN LEGIS 167 (2005) (Westlaw); Act of June 17, 2005, ch. 486, sec. 1, §§ 4 to -6, 2005
Nev. Stat., available at NV LEGIS 486 (Westlaw); Act of June 17, 2005, ch. 485, sec. 1, §§ 17 to -30,
2005 Nev. Stat., available at NV LEGIS 485 (2005) (Westlaw); Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection
Act of 2005, ch. 225, sec. 1, §§ 11-49.2-1 to –.2-7, 2005 R.I. Gen. Laws Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis),
available at 2005 R.I. ALS 225 (LexisNexis); Act effective July 1, 2005, ch. 473, sec. 1, § 47-18-2107,
2005-2 Tenn. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 749, 749-51 (LexisNexis); Identity Theft Enforcement and
Protection Act, ch. 294, sec. 2, §§ 48.001 to -.203, 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at TX
LEGIS 294 (2005) (Westlaw); Act of May 10, 2005, ch. 368, §§ 1 to -2, 2005 Wash. Legis. Serv.
(West), available at WA LEGIS 368 (2005) (Westlaw); see generally Reddick, supra note 15
(analyzing security breach notification laws for an insurance trade association).
30.  A database possessor may “lose” the personal information of others in a variety of ways.  For
example, the possessor might (1) fail to protect the information from hackers and other intruders; (2)
erroneously release the information to third persons; or (3) simply misplace the data. In one sense, these
three forms of data loss each involve alleged failure to exercise reasonable care, and in that respect, they
may be nothing more than different examples of negligent data handling. However, on closer scrutiny,
the three types of data loss identified above may be legally distinguishable. Failure to guard against
Parties are now litigating cases over the liability of database possessors,27 and
lawyers are starting to advise clients about the risk that they may be accountable for
harm caused by hackers and other intruders.28 However, despite the recent
enactment of security breach notification statutes in at least eighteen states,29 the
law governing database possessor liability is far from settled. Considerable
uncertainty exists regarding the reach of the new state laws and related concerns,
including what types of damages plaintiffs might recover in tort actions involving
data intrusion. This Article addresses three key questions relating to database
possessor liability for harm caused by data intruders.30
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intruders raises the issue of whether there is a duty to undertake what amounts to crime fighting efforts,
which is a point of some controversy. See Dupont v. Aavid Thermal Techs., Inc., 798 A.2d 587, 592
(N.H. 2002) (stating that an employer has no broad duty to protect an employee from foreseeable crimes
because “the general duty to protect citizens from criminal attacks is a government function”). In
contrast, the duty to protect third persons from criminal intruders is not a significant concern in cases
involving erroneous release or careless loss of data. Similarly, when database owners publish the wrong
data, an exercise (albeit an imprudent exercise) of First Amendment rights to free speech or free press
has occurred. The constitutional principles that have evolved to constrain the imposition of tort liability
for utterances resulting in defamation or incitement might arguably also limit the levying of tort liability
for erroneous publication of data that causes harm. However, those same principles would have no
application in suits involving hacked or misplaced data because the database possessor never had an
intent to speak or publish anything in those situations. Tort literature has not yet fully explored the
issues relating to these various types of data losses. This Article is primarily concerned with a database
possessor’s duty to protect data from intruders.
31.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
32.  See, e.g., McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 468 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that the
failure to correct earlier true statements which have become false or misleading was fraudulent).
33.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005) (discussing duty based on prior conduct).
The first issue, considered in Part II, is whether database possessors have a
legal duty to safeguard data subjects’ personal information from unauthorized
access by hackers or others. The discussion addresses the obligations imposed by
statutes, ordinary tort principles (including the rules on voluntary assumption of
duty), and fiduciary-duty law. Part II concludes that, in a wide range of
circumstances, database possessors have (or should have) a legal obligation to data
subjects to exercise reasonable care in safeguarding personal data from intruders.
However, as discussed below, the precise theory under which the law imposes that
duty may have important implications for defining the scope of liability.
The next issue, considered in Part III, concerns not whether there is a duty to
protect computerized information from intruders, but whether a database possessor
has a legal obligation to disclose evidence of a security breach to data subjects once
an intrusion occurs. The discussion considers statutory obligations as well as basic
tort principles. The relevant legislation includes the security breach notification
laws recently passed in many states.31 Pertinent common law guidance encompasses
the basic principles of negligence liability and two specific rules that warrant
special attention. The first rule, under the law of misrepresentation, imposes a duty
to update previously accurate statements that are the basis for pending or continuing
reliance.32 This rule is relevant because a breach of data security may cast
substantial doubt on the continuing accuracy of expansive statements about data
security that are often contained in business advertisements or published privacy
policies. The second rule, under failure-to-act jurisprudence, creates a duty to
exercise reasonable care to prevent harm or minimize adverse consequences if prior
conduct, “even though not tortious,” creates a “continuing risk of physical harm.”33
This rule may be relevant because the security practices of database possessors,
even if not negligent, often contribute to the success of hackers and other intruders.
Finally, Part III considers the heightened candor obligations imposed by fiduciary-
duty law. Part III concludes that in many situations there is (or should be) a duty,
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34.  See generally Jay M. Feinman, Doctrinal Classification and Economic Negligence, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 137, 146 (1996) [hereinafter Doctrinal Classification] (“[T]he economic loss rule
distinguishes purely pecuniary losses from losses due to personal injury or property damage . . . as the
criterion that governs the classification of cases. Economic losses are losses due to disappointed
expectations, and should therefore be governed by contract law; only losses due to personal injury or
property damage, which generally are not the subject of prior bargaining and which invoke public safety
concerns, are within the realm of tort law.”).
35.  “In the context of a toxic exposure action, a claim for medical monitoring seeks to recover the
cost of future periodic medical examinations intended to facilitate early detection and treatment of
disease caused by a plaintiff’s exposure to toxic substances.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863
P.2d 795, 821 (Cal. 1993) (citing Ayers v. Twp. of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287, 308 (N.J. 1987)). See also
Badillo v. American Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 439 (Nev. 2001) (noting that “a growing number of
appellate courts have recognized medical monitoring (seventeen states plus the District of Columbia)”).
enforceable in a tort action for damages, to inform data subjects that the security of
their data has been compromised.
The final key issue, addressed in Part IV, concerns how far the liability of a
database possessor should extend in cases where the possessor has failed to exercise
reasonable care to protect data or to disclose information about intrusion. The
discussion first considers the economic-loss rule34 and concludes that the rule
presents an important, but limited, obstacle to recovery of tort damages. In certain
circumstances, economic damages caused by identity theft resulting from
improperly accessed data should be recoverable. Part IV then addresses the issue
of emotional-distress damages and considers the arguments favoring limited
liability for this type of loss in cybersecurity litigation. Part IV discusses the
guidance that has emerged from the courts in fear-of-disease cases and recommends
adapting those principles to the context of improperly accessed data. Emotional-
distress damages should be available only when an intruder actually accesses a
plaintiff’s data, and not when that data was merely exposed to a risk of
unauthorized access. Lastly, Part IV argues that, in the absence of aggravated
tortious conduct (e.g., recklessness or worse), the interests of society will be best
served by limiting recoverable losses to the cost of “security-monitoring” damages
once a database possessor discloses to the affected individual the fact that someone
has improperly accessed his or her data. This approach will encourage database
possessors to discover and reveal instances of data intrusion. It will also place data
subjects in a position to protect their own interests by monitoring their economic
and personal security when heightened vulnerability exists. This security-
monitoring damages proposal is similar in concept to medical-monitoring
damages,35 losses that many states permit victims of toxic exposure to recover. The
proposed limitation on liability will encourage the exercise of care by both database
possessors and data subjects, while at the same time minimizing the risk of
imposing the type of extensive tort damages that would discourage the use of
computer technology or impose disproportionate liability.
II. THE DUTY TO PROTECT DATABASE INFORMATION
Tort liability depends on the existence of a legal duty to exercise care that runs
from the defendant (the database possessor) to the plaintiff (the data subject). Both
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36.  See Rustad, supra note 3, at 108 (“A hospital has a statutory duty to protect the privacy of its
patients’ records.”).
37.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. b (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing express and implied statutory causes of action).
38.  Sometimes courts find an “implicit” legislative intent to create a civil cause of action; other
times they simply hold that the statute is an appropriate expression of the standard of care. See VINCENT
R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 305–06 (3d ed. 2005) (“In the one case,
the court is saying that the legislation sets the standard because the legislature implicitly intended it to
do so, and in the other case, the court acknowledges that the statute sets the standard because the court
thinks that is a good idea. Either way, if the statute does not expressly create a cause of action, the
essential inquiry is the same:  was the law intended to protect this class of persons from this type of
harm.”).
39.  See, e.g., Preston & Turner, supra note 26, at 461–63 (discussing the contours of the
California SBIA).
40.  Act effective July 1, 2003, ch. 915, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West), available at CA LEGIS 915
(2002) (Westlaw).
41.  See Reddick, supra note 15, at 2.
42.  See id. at 1 (indicating that “most new laws follow the California security breach notification
SBIA”).
43.  For a discussion of the notification laws, see infra Part III.A.
statutes and common law may impose that duty of care. The following subparts
discuss legislation bearing on the question of whether a tort duty to safeguard the
security of computerized personal data exists, and how ordinary tort principles and
fiduciary-duty law provide two obvious sources of common law guidance on that
question.
A. Statutes Legislatively Creating a Cause of Action
A statute may impose a duty to exercise care to protect data from intruders,36
either by the legislation’s express terms37 or by a court’s holding that a statute
which is silent as to civil liability sets the appropriate standard of care for a tort
action.38 This subpart discusses statutes that expressly create a civil cause of action
based on lack of data security. The next subpart discusses statutes that do not create
a tort cause of action, but that courts may embrace as setting the standard of care
for suits involving an allegedly negligent failure to safeguard computerized
personal data.
An important example of legislation expressly creating a civil cause of action
for failure to protect data is California’s much-discussed39 Security Breach
Information Act (SBIA).40 The SBIA was the first law in the United States to
impose on businesses a duty to inform data subjects of unauthorized intrusion into
their personal data.41 The California Act has served as a model for legislation
subsequently adopted in other jurisdictions.42 Mutual concerns animate the various
state laws, which often share a common language and structure. All of the laws
impose a duty to reveal information about security breaches,43 but the statutes differ
in important respects. One key difference concerns whether the statutes expressly
impose a duty to protect data in addition to the notification duty. Another difference
concerns whether a breach of the duties imposed by the act is expressly actionable
in a private lawsuit.
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44.  Act effective July 1, 2003, ch. 915, 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. (West), available at CA LEGIS 915
(2002) (Westlaw).
45.  See Daniel J. McCoy, Recent Privacy Law Developments Affecting the Workplace, 788
PLI/PAT 435, 489 (May 2004) (discussing the California SBIA).
46.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (West Supp. 2005). The statute broadly defines the term
“business.” See id. at § 1798.80(a). However, section 1798.81.5 does not apply to certain specified
entities including, among others, certain healthcare providers and financial institutions. See
id. § 1798.81.5(e). The obligations the California statute imposes reach “well beyond California’s
borders, potentially affecting any company, person or agency that has a computer database containing
any California resident’s ‘personal information.’” Tyler Paetkau & Roxanne Torabian-Bashardoust,
California Deals with ID Theft:  The Promise and the Problems, BUS. L. TODAY, May-June 2004, at
37, 37. Significantly, “the law only applies when an individual’s ‘unencrypted data’ is at issue.” Id. at
41.
47.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) (West Supp. 2005).
48.  Id. § 1798.81.5 (b) (emphasis added).
49.  Id. § 1798.81.5(c).
50.  The fact that liability arises from negligence may mean that an action is subject to a
comparative negligence defense. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM
§ 14 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (stating that in dealing with a “liability right expressly
created by [a] statute[,] . . . the court may need to consider whether traditional tort defenses such as
comparative negligence should be deemed impliedly incorporated into the statutory cause of action”).
But see Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 811–13 (Minn. 1981) (discussing situations where statutes
impose absolute liability).
51.  While adoption of the SBIA was pending, the Information Technology Association of
America (ITAA) wrote to the state Senate Committee on Privacy, raised the “specter of lawsuits
targeting companies for even innocent mistakes,” and requested amendments to “cap the liability
The California SBIA imposes a data protection obligation and expressly
authorizes maintenance of a suit for damages for breach of that duty.44 The relevant
language, which became effective July 1, 2003,45 states, “A business that owns or
licenses personal information about a California resident shall implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of
the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access,
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.”46 The legislation further provides,
“Any customer injured by a violation of this title may institute a civil action to
recover damages.”47
The SBIA leaves no doubt that businesses owe a legal duty to customers under
California law to protect customers’ personal information, and that customers may
recover damages if businesses breach that duty. The civil actions that the California
legislature has allowed the courts to entertain are rooted in principles of negligence
(rather than, for example, strict liability or recklessness), for the law speaks of
“reasonable security procedures and practices”48 that are “appropriate to the nature
of the information.”49 Reasonableness assessed under the circumstances is the
essence of the negligence standard of care. Only unreasonable (i.e., negligent)
conduct violates the California SBIA. However, beyond offering clear guidance
regarding the existence of duty and the liability regime, the SBIA leaves many
matters unsettled.50 The Act makes no attempt to define what constitutes
“reasonable security procedures and practices.” Presumably, that assessment is left
to the finder of fact for determination on a case-by-case basis. More importantly,
the SBIA gives no indication as to what types of damages plaintiffs can recover.51
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exposure.” Calif. Bill Analysis, Senate Floor, 2001–2002 Regular Session, Assembly Bill 700, Aug. 22,
2002, available in Westlaw at CA B. An., A.B. 700 Sen., 8/22/2002. However, the ITAA offered no
suggestion for how to effectuate such a cap, and the Committee report simply notes that “AB 700 does
not create any new penalty in law.” Id. 
52.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered
sections of Titles 12 and 15 of the United States Code).
53.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 501(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801(a) (2000)) (emphasis added).
54.  15 U.S.C. § 6805 (defining entities and roles); see also 15 U.S.C. § 6825 (stating that “each
Federal banking agency . . . , the National Credit Union Administration, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission or self-regulatory organizations, as appropriate, shall review regulations and
guidelines applicable to financial institutions under their respective jurisdictions and shall prescribe
such revisions to such regulations and guidelines as may be necessary to ensure that such financial
institutions have policies, procedures, and controls in place to prevent the unauthorized disclosure of
customer financial information and to deter and detect [the solicitation or obtaining of customer
information by false pretenses]”).
55.  15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (discussing establishment of regulations).
56.  15 U.S.C. § 6805(a) (providing that the regulations “shall be enforced by the Federal
functional regulators, the State insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission with respect
to financial institutions and other persons subject to their jurisdiction”).
57.  “Financial institutions under the Act include everything from real estate appraisers to
automobile dealerships.” McMahon, supra note 4, at 634–35.
58.  15 U.S.C. § 6801(b).
Whether those damages include compensation for personal injury, property
damage, emotional distress, economic loss, or other types of harm is left
unresolved. If the legislature intended for courts to allow recovery of the usual
types of damages that they award in negligence suits, the scope of damages, as
discussed in Part IV, may be more limited than it first appears.
B. Statutes Judicially Determined to Set the Standard of Care
Some statutes addressing issues relating to data protection do not expressly
create a civil cause of action. In this category are the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act of 1999 (GLBA)52 and certain state security breach notification laws. The
following subparts discuss these various pieces of legislation.
1. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
The GLBA states that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress that each financial
institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its
customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’
nonpublic personal information.”53 In furtherance of that policy, the Act requires
a significant number of state and federal governmental entities54 to establish55 and
enforce56 “appropriate standards for the financial institutions57 subject to their
jurisdiction.”58 Those standards must provide 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards—
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer
records and information;
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59.  15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2000).
60.  Julia C. Schiller, Comment, Informational Privacy v. The Commercial Speech Doctrine:  Can
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Provide Adequate Privacy Protection?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 349,
359 (2003) (“The GLB Act . . . does not provide for a private right of action for consumers to sue the
financial institution directly for violation of the statute.”).
The consumer must complain to the agency having jurisdiction over them and that
agency may bring a court action against the financial institution. However, some
state laws, such as the Unfair and Deceptive Practice Laws, may enable the
consumer to claim that a violation of the GLB Act violated other rights granted
to the individual by the state.
Id. 
61.  See White, supra note 4, at 865–66 (discussing negligence per se under the GLBA).
62.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing negligence per se). In most jurisdictions, the unexcused violation
of a standard-setting statute is conclusive proof of breach of duty and constitutes negligence per se, see
generally id. § 14 cmt. c, or prima facie negligence, see, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of Transp. v. Christensen,
581 N.W.2d 807, 809 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998). Regardless of the precise procedural effect of establishing
an unexcused violation, a determination that the enactment is controlling affirms that a legal duty runs
from the defendant to the plaintiff. The jury is not free to ignore that determination. See Martin v.
Herzog, 126 N.E. 814, 815 (N.Y. 1920) (stating that “[j]urors have no dispensing power”).
63.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing relevant considerations).
64.  See id. § 14 cmt. d (noting that “in most highway-accident cases, findings of negligence
depend on ascertaining which party has violated the relevant provisions of the state’s motor-vehicle
code”).
65.  See Martin, 126 N.E. at 814–15 (discussing negligence predicated on failure to stay to the
right of the center of the highway, as required by statute).
66.  See id. at 815 (holding that the failure of a wagon driver to display the lights required by a
highway law was negligent).
67.  See Griffith v. Schmidt, 715 P.2d 905, 911 (Idaho 1985) (holding that exceeding the speed
limit was negligence per se).
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the
security or integrity of such records; and 
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
records or information which could result in substantial harm
or inconvenience to any customer.59
The GLBA does not expressly create a civil cause of action against financial
institutions for breach of their duty to protect customer information.60 However, one
commentator has suggested61 that the provisions of the Act, or the standards
adopted pursuant to the Act, might serve as the predicate for a tort action under a
negligence per se theory.62
Under negligence per se, a court may, in its discretion, embrace a statute not
expressly providing for a civil cause of action as the standard of care for a tort suit.
If the legislature intended the enactment to protect the class of persons of which the
plaintiff is a member from the type of harm that occurred, a court may determine
that violation of the statute defines the appropriate terms for imposing civil
liability.63 For example, courts have frequently adopted traffic rules64—such as
those requiring drivers to travel in the proper lane,65 use headlights after dark,66 or
not exceed the speed limit67—as setting the standard of care in auto accident cases
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68.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. e (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
69.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1965) (discussing obsolescence).
70.  See, e.g., Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 302, 309 (Tex. 1998) (holding that a statute imposing
a reporting requirement on “any person having cause to believe [that] a child [was] being abused” was
not an appropriate standard for negligence per se liability because, among other things, the statutory
standard was unclear).
71.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. e
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (noting that negligence per se in the case of a statute duplicating the
common law does nothing to aid the court in determining negligence).
72.  See id. § 14 cmt. c (“If the statute does include . . . a provision [making the statutory violation
irrelevant in a common law action for damages], courts should of course honor it . . . .”); see also Pool
v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1986) (holding that the lower court misapplied two
statutes, one that provided that the presumption of intoxication would not apply in civil actions, and
another that stated that “maximum or minimum speed limitations shall not be construed to relieve the
plaintiff in any action from the burden of proving negligence” (quoting TEX. REV. CIV. STATE. ANN.
art 6701d, § 171(b) (Vernon 1977) (repealed 1995))).
73.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 46 n.29 (“It could be argued
that financial institutions have an existing duty under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley implementing
regulations to provide immediate and effective incident response to protect the confidentiality of
consumer data maintained on their own networks”).
74.  Cf. County of Dallas v. Poston, 104 S.W.3d 719, 722–23 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that
because the statutory duty of a motor vehicle operator crossing a highway to yield the right-of-way to
an approaching vehicle is not absolute, the statute was not a proper basis for a finding of contributory
negligence as a matter of law; the appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonably prudent driver under the
same or similar circumstances would have yielded the right-of-way).
because the intent of those laws is to protect others on the road from the risk of
physical harm. Referring to legislative enactments in tort litigation serves the
“function of simplifying or providing structure to the rendering of negligence
determinations.”68 Such reference also helps ensure consistency in resolving issues
of recurring importance and provides clear notice to others as to what should be
done in given circumstances.
However, a court may take into account factors other than the class of persons
and the type of harm in determining whether a statute silent as to civil liability
appropriately defines what society expects of a reasonably prudent person. For
example, a court should not embrace a statute that is obsolete,69 vague,70 or
duplicative of existing common law obligations as the basis for civil liability.71
Similarly, if the legislature intended the penalties for violation of a law to be
minimal or limited only to those set forth in the enactment, a court should not rely
on the law as a basis for imposing other legal obligations.72
The GLBA is an important expression of public policy that courts should take
into account in determining whether database possessors, or some subset thereof
(e.g., financial institutions or businesses generally), have a legal duty to protect
information relating to data subjects that is enforceable in a tort action.73 Indeed, as
an enactment of Congress, the nation’s highest legislative body, the language of the
GLBA is entitled to great weight in resolution of the duty question. However,
courts should not interpret the GLBA itself as setting the standard of care for a civil
cause of action because it lacks specificity as to precise requirements of a
reasonable financial institution.74 In contrast to a law that gives clear notice of
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75.  See, e.g., Zeni v. Anderson, 243 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Mich. 1976) (discussing a sidewalk
statute).
76.  Ranard v. O’Neil, 531 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Mont. 1975).
77.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 14 cmt. i (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
78.  Cf. id. § 14 cmt. e (“Many statutes impose obligations on actors that largely correspond to or
codify obligations imposed by negligence law . . . .  Thus a statute might require motorists to drive their
vehicles at a ‘reasonable and prudent’ speed, or might prohibit driving the vehicle ‘carelessly.’ To find
that an actor has violated such a statute, the jury would also need to find that the actor has behaved
negligently. In such situations, the doctrine of negligence per se is largely superfluous in ascertaining
the actor’s liability. . . . [C]ourts sometimes allow parties to argue negligence per se as a supplement
to ordinary negligence; but more frequently they reject negligence per se, recognizing its
redundancy . . . .”); see also Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Knighten, 976 S.W.2d 674, 675 (Tex. 1998)
(holding that a statute governing the responsibility of a driver following another vehicle—which
required the driver to proceed safely and safely bring a vehicle to a stop—imposed a duty of reasonable
care on the driver and precluded the leading driver from obtaining a negligence per se instruction in an
action arising out of a rear-end collision).
79.  See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–.5 (2005); see also
CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 57–58 (stating that “[o]n May 17, 2002,
the FTC issued the Safeguards Rule, which implements the safeguard provisions required by the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The Safeguards Rule requires covered entities to implement a comprehensive
information security program by May 23, 2003, to ensure the security, confidentiality, and integrity of
nonpublic customer information against both internal and external threats. Institutions that fail to
comply could face potential FTC enforcement actions and potential liability under state consumer
protection laws or common law claims (such as negligence)”).
expectations—such as a statute that requires a pedestrian to walk on the sidewalk,
not in the street,75 or to yield to all vehicles already on the road76—the GLBA offers
no clear guidance as to exactly what a financial institution must do to avoid
liability. The Act is vague and speaks of an obligation to protect data security
without indicating what must be done to fulfill that obligation. The GLBA’s
vagueness, coupled with its failure to provide for civil liability, means that the
questions of whether there is a tort duty, and, if so, what that duty requires, are
issues that the courts must still resolve. Of course, “the presence of a statutory
requirement that is binding on the defendant, and the court’s awareness of the
legislature’s assumptions in imposing that requirement, can be important points for
the court to consider in determining whether a duty exists.”77 But the question of
duty requires judicial determination. Consequently, insofar as the GLBA is
concerned, it is not useful to speak of negligence per se.78
The same analysis would not necessarily apply to the regulations adopted
pursuant to the mandates of the GLBA. Unlike the statute itself, the provisions
adopted to implement its mandates might be sufficiently specific to define what
action financial institutions must take with regard to protecting data security.
However, the standards agencies have already adopted, such as those issued by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC),79 are typically flexible in nature, equivocal as
to what must be done, and generally unsuited to defining the conduct expected of
a reasonably prudent financial institution. The FTC standards require financial
institutions subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction to develop and implement a
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80.  See 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (stating that financial institutions “shall develop, implement, and
maintain a comprehensive information security program that is written . . . and contains administrative,
technical, and physical safeguards that are appropriate to your size and complexity, the nature and scope
of your activities, and the sensitivity of any customer information at issue”).
81.  See id. § 314.4(b) (“At a minimum, . . . a risk assessment should include consideration of risks
in each relevant area of your operations, including:  (1) Employee training and management; (2)
Information systems, including network and software design, as well as information processing, storage,
transmission and disposal; and (3) Detecting, preventing and responding to attacks, intrusions, or other
systems failures.”).
82.  Id. § 314.4(c).
83.  See id. § 314.4(e) (requiring adjustments in light of “any material changes to your operations
or business arrangements; or any other circumstances that you know or have reason to know may have
a material impact on your information security program”). 
84.  See 12 C.F.R. Pt. 30, App. B (2005). One provision in the Interagency Guidelines that has
some degree of specificity concerns service providers. The Guidelines state that “[e]ach bank
shall . . . [r]equire its service providers by contract to implement appropriate measures designed to meet
the objectives of these Guidelines.” Id. However, this rule is unlikely to serve as a helpful standard for
resolving tort litigation brought by customers. The plaintiff would have to show that not only did the
service provider fail to employ appropriate safeguards, but also that the failure would not have occurred
except for the absence of a contractual provision. Such a finding would entail a degree of speculation
by the fact-finder, and might present the type of causation problem that is sufficient to dissuade a court
from embracing a rule as establishing the threshold for liability. See Stachniewicz v. Mar-Cam Corp.,
488 P.2d 436, 438 (Or. 1971) (declining to hold that a dram shop statute set the standard of care because
doing so would complicate the causation assessment).
85.  The GLBA also regulates extensively the sharing of personal data between institutions. A
violation of those provisions does not give an affected individual a private cause of action. See Menton
v. Experian Corp., No. 02 Civ. 4687 (NRB), 2003 WL 21692820, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2003)
(finding, in dicta, no private right of action).
86.  See generally Preston & Turner, supra note 26, at 471–77 (discussing data security provisions
in the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and the Children’s Online
Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)).
written security plan “appropriate”80 to their size and complexity which takes into
account various sources of risk,81 regularly tests the effectiveness of its “safeguards’
key controls, systems, and procedures,”82 and undergoes periodic adjustment as
necessary.83 Thus, the standards simply endorse a process by which financial
institutions must address security issues. Like the GLBA itself, the FTC standards
offer no clear guidance as to precisely what precautions financial institutions must
implement to protect data security. The same is true of the federal Interagency
Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, which
address the obligations imposed by the GLBA.84 As yet, no reported cases have
held that the data security provisions85 of the GLBA or related regulations, or other
federal laws,86 set the standard of care for a consumer’s tort action against a
financial institution.
2. State Security Breach Notification Laws
Certain state security breach notification laws that require database possessors
to protect personal information from unauthorized access make no provision for
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87.  See Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005, ch. 225, sec. 1, § 11-49.2-2(2), 2005
R.I. Gen. Laws Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis), available at 2005 R.I. ALS 225 (LexisNexis) (“A
business that owns or licenses computerized unencripted personal information about a Rhode Island
resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the
nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modification, or disclosure.”). Each violation of the Rhode Island law “is a civil violation for which
a penalty of not more than a hundred dollars ($100) per occurrence and not more than twenty-five
thousand dollars ($25,000) may be adjudged against a defendant.”). Id. § 11-49.2-6(A).
88.  Personal Information Protection Act, ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-101 to -108 (Supp. 2005).
The Act requires a “person or business that acquires, owns, or licenses personal information about an
Arkansas resident . . . [to] implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices
appropriate to the nature of the information to protect the personal information from unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” Id. § 4-110-104(b).
89.  Id. § 4-110-108.
90.  Id. § 4-110-106(b) (emphasis added).
91.  Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act, ch. 294, sec. 2, §§ 48.001 to -.203, 2005 Tex.
Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at TX LEGIS 294 (2005) (Westlaw).
92.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West Supp. 2005).
93.  Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act § 48.102(A) (“A business shall implement and
maintain reasonable procedures, including taking any appropriate corrective action, to protect and
safeguard from unlawful use or disclosure any sensitive personal information collected or maintained
by the business . . . .”).
94.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b).
95.  Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act § 48.203.
96.  See Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act § 48.101 (providing that “[a] person may
not obtain, possess, transfer, or use personal identifying information of another person without the other
person’s consent and with intent to obtain a good, a service, insurance, an extension of credit, or any
other thing of value in the other person’s name”).
97.  “A canon of construction holding that to express or include one thing implies the exclusion
of the other, or of the alternative.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 620 (8th ed. 2004).
civil liability.87 Some of these laws may nevertheless leave room for judicial
recognition of a civil cause of action. For example, the Arkansas Personal
Information Protection Act,88 which provides only for enforcement by the attorney
general,89 states that the Act “does not relieve a person or business from a duty to
comply with any other requirements of other state and federal law regarding the
protection and privacy of personal information.”90 However, the use of the word
“other” seems to suggest that a court should not embrace the security breach
notification law, by itself, as the basis for a civil cause of action.
Similarly, it is difficult to envision that the Texas state security breach statute
could be a predicate for a negligence per se claim. The Texas law,91 like its
California predecessor,92 obliges a database possessor to exercise care to protect the
personal information of data subjects.93 However, unlike the California SBIA,94 the
Texas act does not create a civil cause of action against a database possessor who
fails to exercise reasonable care. Indeed, while the Texas act is silent on that
subject, it expressly provides for a deceptive trade practices action95 against hackers
and others who “obtain, possess, transfer, or use [the] personal identifying
information of another” without authorization.96 It would be reasonable to interpret
the Texas statute as an expression that civil liability should extend only to hackers
and other unauthorized persons, and not to database possessors. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.97 Public policy could support that construction of the law because
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98.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 9 (noting that it is a policy foundation of American
tort law that “[c]ourts should accord due deference to co-equal branches of government”; “there are
occasions when the judiciary should eschew action in favor of other branches . . . . [C]ertain questions
are best left to the legislature because of its ability to gather facts through the legislative hearing
process, to craft comprehensive solutions to broad-ranging questions, or to represent the will of the
public on highly controversial issues” (emphasis omitted)).
99.  Cf. Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Dep’t., 497 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1993)
(holding that violation of the Crime Victims Reparations Act (CVRA) does not create private cause of
action against law enforcement agencies when the agencies failed to inform the plaintiffs of their rights
to seek reparations. “Principles of judicial restraint preclude us from creating a new statutory cause of
action that does not exist at common law where the legislature has not either by the statute’s express
terms or by implication provided for civil tort liability.”).
100.  162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
101.  439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
102.  JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW:  CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON,
AND WYTHE AS MAKERS OF THE MASKS 111 (1976).
103.  Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
104.  Id. at 99.
105.  Id.
106.  Id. at 100.
judicial deference to a coequal branch of government98 means that a court should
not create a cause of action where the legislature has implicitly determined that
none should exist.99
C. Basic Tort Principles
1. Palsgraf, Kline, and Related Cases
Turning to the issue of whether common law principles—as opposed to
statutes—support judicial recognition of a database possessor’s duty to safeguard
information from intruders, two landmark cases offer guidance:  Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co.100 and Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.101
These decisions have appeared in countless tort casebooks, and judicial decisions
have cited them scores of times. Palsgraf and Kline are important pillars in the
temple of American tort law.
In Palsgraf, the most famous tort case of all time, the majority opinion was
written by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo, the “most justly celebrated of American
common-law judges.”102 Cardozo set down the basic rule on duty for the New York
Court of Appeals:  “The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the range
of apprehension.”103 In Palsgraf, nothing in the appearance of a newspaper-wrapped
package carried by a man trying to board a moving train gave notice that the parcel
contained explosives.104 Therefore, nothing warned the trainmen that Helen
Palsgraf, a patron waiting across the platform, was in danger.105 There was no “risk
[to her] reasonably to be perceived” and thus no “duty [to her] to be obeyed.”106 So
far as she was concerned, the railroad had no legal obligation not to carelessly
dislodge the package while trying to assist the man who was running for the train
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107.  Id. at 99.
108.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928).
109.  See, e.g., Holder v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 5 S.W.3d 654, 654–58 (Tex. 1999) (deciding, with
reliance on Palsgraf, that the owner of a parking garage was not responsible for an attack perpetrated
there on a third person by a stranger in the middle of the night because the owner had no reason to
foresee that the victim would be present at that hour).
110.  Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 100.
111.  Id.
112.  Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
113.  Id. at 479.
114.  Id. at 486–88.
115.  Id. at 487 (stating that a landlord’s “duty is to take those measures of protection which are
within his power and capacity to take, and which can reasonably be expected to mitigate the risk of
intruders assaulting and robbing tenants”).
116.  Id. at 480.
“but seemed unsteady as if about to fall.”107 Because no duty ran to Palsgraf, the
railroad was not liable in negligence for the harm she sustained when the package
fell and exploded.108
Courts today continue to apply the Palsgraf duty rule.109 Thus, it is useful to
ask whether, from the standpoint of database possessors, there is a “risk reasonably
to be perceived”110 to data subjects if data is not protected from unauthorized
intrusion. Obviously, in many situations (such as where hackers can access data via
the Internet), the answer is “yes.” The risk is entirely foreseeable, and a threat to the
interests of data subjects is “within the range of apprehension.”111 At least on its
face, the basic rule in Palsgraf suggests that database possessors should often have
a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect data from intruders.
Palsgraf did not involve the threat of criminal intervention, but Kline did.112 In
Kline, a landlord was on notice that “an increasing number of assaults, larcenies,
and robberies [were] being perpetrated against the tenants in and from the common”
areas of a large apartment building.113 In holding the landlord responsible for a
subsequent attack on the plaintiff, the court said that a landlord is by no “means an
insurer of the safety of his tenants” and is not obliged “to provide protection
commonly owed by a municipal police department.”114 However, a landlord is
under a duty to take such precautions as “are within his power and capacity to take”
in order to prevent harm by criminal intruders.115 In writing for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey emphasized the fact that the
landlord was the only party in a position to secure the common areas:
No individual tenant had it within his power to take measures to
guard the garage entranceways, to provide scrutiny at the main
entrance of the building, to patrol the common hallways and
elevators, to set up any kind of a security alarm system in the
building, to provide additional locking devices on the main doors,
to provide a system of announcement for authorized visitors only,
to close the garage doors at appropriate hours, and to see that the
entrance was manned at all times.116
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117.  Id. at 488.
118.  Cf. White, supra note 4, at 852–53 (“Frequently, an individual does not know how much
information is stored in his digital dossier, or who has compiled it. This makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for an individual to control access to his personal information and, thus, limit his
vulnerability to instances of identity theft.”).
119.  Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
120.  Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 478–79 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
121.  See generally Brendan Delany, Comment, Identity Theft:  The Fair Credit Reporting Act and
Negligent Enablement of Imposter Fraud, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 553, 556 (2005) (arguing for “greater
federal protection for potential victims of identity theft and for common law judicial recognition of the
tort of negligent enablement of impostor fraud”).
The court added:
The landlord is entirely justified in passing on the cost of
increased protective measures to his tenants, but the rationale of
compelling the landlord to do it in the first place is that he is the
only one who is in a position to take the necessary protective
measures for overall protection of the premises . . . .117
A similar analysis is equally applicable to cases involving database security.
Individual data subjects are in a poor position to protect database information from
intruders.118 The database possessor, in contrast, is the only one with the ability to
mitigate the risk that intruders may cause harm. As in Kline, the database possessor
can spread the cost of providing database security to a broader class of data
subjects, at least in cases where there is customer relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant. Kline, like Palsgraf, suggests that, at least in some circumstances,
database possessors should owe data subjects a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect data from intruders.
In both Palsgraf and Kline, there was a relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant. Palsgraf was a ticket purchaser of the defendant railroad;119 Kline
was a tenant of the defendant corporation.120 Those relational ties are important, for
other cases teach that duty often depends upon more than foreseeability of harm and
opportunity to take precautions—it depends, sometimes, on a special linkage
between the party who owes the duty and the one who receives its benefit. In this
regard, recent cases involving allegedly negligent enablement of imposter fraud121
are instructive.
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122.  355 S.C. 329, 585 S.E.2d 275 (2003).
123.  Id. at 331, 585 S.E.2d at 276.
124.  Id.
125.  Id. at 332, 585 S.E.2d at 276.
126.  Id. at 333–34, 585 S.E.2d at 277 (citations omitted).
127.  See, e.g., Smith v. Citibank, N.A., No. 00-0587-CV-W-1-ECF, 2001 WL 34079057, at *2–4
(W.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2001) (holding the credit card issuer was not liable in negligence to a non-customer);
Polzer v. TRW, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (“[P]laintiffs . . . failed to state a
cause of action in negligence, because [the defendants] had no special relationship either with the
impostor who stole the plaintiffs’ credit information and fraudulently obtained credit cards, or with
plaintiffs, with whom they stood simply in a creditor/debtor relationship.”).
128.  Sometimes parties may propose, but not consummate, a business relationship, such as when
an applicant applies to a university but is not accepted for admission. The business (university) benefits
from the solicitation and review of applications, so it may be fair to impose an obligation on the
institution to safeguard the data of the applicant for as long as the institution retains that data. The same
would seem to be true when the relationship has effectively ended, as in the case of a student who has
graduated. Cf. Stacy Finz, Rohnert Park; Hackers Hit College Computer System, Identity Theft Fears
at Sonoma State, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 9, 2005, at B2 (discussing hackers who gained access to the records
of 61,709 persons “who either attended, applied, graduated or worked” at Sonoma State University).
129.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 7–8 (“It has often been urged that . . . . [t]hose who
benefit from dangerous activities should bear resulting losses. Certain activities—e.g., owning a dog
that may bite or using explosives—entail a serious risk of harm to third persons even if care is exercised
by the actor. According to this principle, fairness requires that those who enjoy the benefits of such
conduct should bear resulting losses . . . .  In a related vein, it is sometimes said that an activity ‘must
In Huggins v. Citibank, N.A.,122 for example, the plaintiff sued various banks
on the ground that they “negligently issued credit cards” in the plaintiff’s name to
an “unknown imposter.”123 The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that the banks
issued “credit cards without any investigation, verification, or corroboration” of the
applicant’s identity.124 In response, “the [b]anks asserted they owed no duty to [the
plaintiff] because he was not their customer.”125 The court agreed with the
defendants and wrote:
In order for negligence liability to attach, the parties must have a
relationship recognized by law as the foundation of a duty of care.
In the absence of a duty to prevent an injury, foreseeability of that
injury is an insufficient basis on which to rest liability. . . .
. . . .
. . .  The relationship, if any, between credit card issuers and
potential victims of identity theft is far too attenuated to rise to the
level of a duty between them.126
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.127
Together, Palsgraf, Kline, and Huggins indicate that the strongest cases for
imposing a common law duty to guard data from intruders will be those in which
there is a business relationship128 between the defendant database possessor and the
plaintiff data subject. This conclusion makes sense on economic as well as doctrinal
grounds. Imposing a duty of care in these cases will force the database possessor,
who benefits from the use of computerized information, to internalize losses
relating to improperly accessed data as a cost of doing business.129 That duty will
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pay its own way.’ What this means is that there is good reason for the law to force the promoters of
activities to ‘internalize’ the costs that their endeavors inflict on third persons. Only when those costs
are taken into account, it is argued, are promoters likely to make decisions that are not only personally
beneficial, but socially responsible.” (emphasis omitted)).
130.  But see id. at 743 (discussing the limits of risk spreading).
131.  Cf. Rustad, supra note 3, at 108 (“It is unclear . . . whether a website owes a general duty of
care to website visitors when there is no statutorily mandated standard of care.”).
132.  See Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (indicating that among the policy
considerations typically deemed relevant to whether a duty to act should be imposed are “the moral
blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, [and] the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach”).
133.  Id.
134.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 45 (“If tort law is found to
apply to computer security, then the potential for civil liability lawsuits (with the likelihood of monetary
damages) could encourage companies to invest in computer security measures.”).
135.  See Wible, supra note 16, at 1578 (“Even a nonmalicious trespass disrupts the victim’s
online services while the breach is fixed. . . . [C]ompanies generally expend resources investigating the
matter, often hiring private investigators so that they do not suffer reputational loss.”).
in turn create an incentive for database possessors to scrutinize whether their
business methods are really worth the costs they entail. At the same time, the
imposition of a duty in a business context gives the database possessor a means for
distributing the loss by adjusting the price of the goods or services it sells to the
class of persons that ultimately benefits from the defendant’s business methods.
That reallocation of losses will help ensure that the costs relating to improperly
accessed data will not fall with crushing weight on either the data subject or the
database possessor.130
2. Public Policy Analysis
In addressing questions of duty in unsettled areas of the law,131 courts often ask
whether imposition of duty makes sense as a matter of public policy. They consider,
for example, whether obligating the defendant to exercise care would tend to
minimize harm to potential plaintiffs without being unduly burdensome to the
defendant or disruptive to the community.132  Courts sometimes also consider “the
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved,”133 with the
assumption being that insurability of the risk makes imposition of a duty more
palatable because of the cost-spreading ability of insurance. On each of these
grounds—deterrence of losses, burden to the defendant, community consequences,
and insurance—a good argument exists for requiring database possessors to
exercise care to prevent harm by intruders.
Placing a burden on database possessors to protect data from unauthorized
access would tend to reduce intruder-related losses by encouraging investment in
database security.134 That investment would be consistent with the possessors’ own
interests because unauthorized access entails huge costs for those who maintain
databases.135 Companies must spend large sums of money to protect their
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136.  See Rustad, supra note 3, at 100 (“In 2000, private companies spent an estimated $300
billion in private enforcement efforts against hackers and viruses.”).
137.  See Wible, supra note 16, at 1597–98 ( reporting that “[c]omputer crime cost about $250
million in 1998 and jumped to more than $375 million in 2001.” (footnotes omitted)).
138.  See Steinberg, supra note 26, at 60.
139.  Presumably, the existence of state security breach notification laws increases judicial
willingness to recognize a common law duty to protect databases. Cf. Paetkau & Torabian-Bashardoust,
supra note 46, at 39 (discussing the obligation under California law to disclose security breaches and
opining that “from a legal perspective, if the company notifies only California residents of a security
breach, potentially affected non-Californian residents could persuasively argue that the company was
at least negligent in not notifying them of the breach”).
140.  See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the regulations adopted pursuant to the GLBA).
141.  See Erin Kenneally, Stepping on the Digital Scale:  Duty and Liability for Negligent Internet
Security, 1 Ann. 2002 ATLA-CLE 403 (2002) (discussing the liability of companies doing business on
the web).
142.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 7 (noting that in the development of American tort
law it has often been urged that “[t]he costs of accidents should be spread broadly. The idea underlying
the ‘spreading’ rationale is that the financial burden of accidents may be diminished by spreading losses
broadly so that no person is forced to bear a large share of the damages. . . . Losses can be spread not
only through increases in the costs of goods and services, but through other devices such as taxation and
insurance” (emphasis omitted)).
143.  See Steinberg, supra note 26, at 60 (stating that “[s]tand-alone network-risk, hacker, or cyber
insurance is now being offered . . . . [T]hese policies offer protection against intangible data loss from
viruses, denial-of-service attacks, and theft of consumer information—and the protection can extend
to third-party liabilities. Insurance premiums remain considerable, and prequalifying security
assessments can be demanding; moreover, legal advice is often a pre-requisite for navigating the various
gaps and exclusions written into such policies”).
websites136 and other data sources, and to cover resulting harm when protection
efforts are unsuccessful.137 “The financial losses facing corporate America as a
result of network security breaches are staggering—hundreds of millions, if not
billions, of dollars each year.”138 The burden resulting from the imposition of a legal
duty would by no means be solely for the benefit of potential plaintiffs.
The imposition of a common law tort duty to protect databases would also be
consistent with the developing fabric of the law. As the preceding discussion
suggests, an increasing number of statutes139 and regulations,140 as well as
commentators,141 say that database possessors must exercise reasonable care to
protect computerized personal data from unauthorized access. Thus, recognition of
a tort duty to protect data would not be disruptive to the community. The duty
would not require new institutions or controversial practices. Indeed, a common law
tort duty to protect data would complement recent developments in both law and
business.
Insurance can spread the liability risks arising from data intrusion,142 and
insurance companies are now offering these policies.143 Of equal importance,
insurers can and do provide guidance to their insureds about practices calculated
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144.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 65–66 (discussing how the
insurance industry can motivate responsible practices in the private sector); Jay P. Kesan, Rupterto P.
Majuca, & William J. Yurcik, The Economic Case for Cyberinsurance 19 (Univ. of Ill. Coll. of Law,
Working Paper No. 2, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=577862 (stating that cyberinsurance
“companies can . . . facilitate standards for best practices by calibrating the amount of IT security they
require the insured to possess to socially-optimal levels”).
145.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 51 (discussing the practical
problems that may arise from a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure data security).
146.  See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, The Developing U.S. Legal Standard for Cybersecurity, 4
SEDONA CONF. J. 109, 109 (discussing “laws and regulations requiring security” and “the developing
trend as to what businesses must do to satisfy their legal obligations to provide appropriate security”).
147.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 50 (“As a motivating factor
for industry to adopt best practices, tort law can be a significant complement to standard-setting,
because compliance with industry-wide standards is usually an acceptable demonstration of due care.”);
Randy V. Sabett, Graceful Disclosure:  The Pros & Cons of Mandatory Reporting of Security
Vulnerabilities, 4 SEDONA CONF. J. 121, 124 (2003) (stating that “several organizations have developed
vulnerability disclosure policies” relating to software).
148.  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing duty based on undertaking).
149.  See id. § 42 cmt. e (discussing promises as undertakings).
150.  See id. § 42 (“An actor who undertakes to render services to another that the actor knows or
should know reduce the risk of physical harm to the other has a duty of reasonable care to the other in
conducting the undertaking if . . . the failure to exercise such care increases the risk of harm beyond that
which existed without the undertaking.”).
to minimize liability.144 That advice helps to reduce the frequency and amount of
future losses, thereby reinforcing the deterrence objectives of the law. 
Imposing a tort duty under which database possessors will be liable for
negligent data security practices will inevitably leave many questions unanswered.
To say that an enterprise has a duty to exercise reasonable care to ensure data
security provides no clear guidance as to practical questions, such as how often
patches should be applied to security software.145 But these types of questions are
no different than those that courts face in a thousand other settings when they apply
the rules of negligence liability. Over the long run, the burden of uncertainty will
be minimized by evolving guidance found in scholarship discussing court decisions
and legislation,146 the development of industry customs,147 and the promulgation of
regulations which help define conduct required of a potential defendant seeking to
avoid liability.
3. Voluntary Assumption of Duty
Even if courts decline to impose a tort duty to safeguard data on database
possessors generally (or at least on businesses), voluntary-assumption-of-duty
principles may create a legally enforceable data-protection obligation.148 A person
not otherwise under a duty to exercise reasonable care may voluntarily assume the
responsibility to do so. One way of voluntarily assuming this duty is by promising
to exercise care and thereby inducing detrimental reliance.149 Another way is by
“undertak[ing] to render services” and consequently increasing the risk of harm to
the plaintiff.150 Either way, the party who undertook the duty of reasonable care will
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151.  See generally Therese G. Franzén & Leslie Howell, Financial Privacy Rules:  A Step By Step
Guide to the New Disclosure Requirements Under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Implementing
Regulations, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 17, 20-21 (2001) (discussing privacy notices).
152.  Bank of America, Privacy Policy for Consumers 2005, http://www.bankofamerica.com/
privacy/index.cfm?template=privacysecur_cnsmr (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
153.  See id.
154.  See Dash, From Data Holders, supra note 14 (reporting that “financial services and
technology companies have been quietly tweaking their advertising to incorporate themes about the
safety of customers’ data”).
155.  Bank of America, Online Banking, http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/
index.cfm?template =privacysecure_olb (last visited Oct. 30, 2005).
be subject to liability if it breaches the voluntarily assumed duty and causes
damages.
These well-established principles might apply to situations where consumers
reveal personal information to financial institutions in reliance on financial
institutions’ stated privacy policies.151 For example, the policy of one major
banking institution, which is not atypical, states in reassuring terms:
The law gives you certain privacy rights. Bank of America
gives you more.
. . . .
Keeping financial information secure is one of our most
important responsibilities. We maintain physical, electronic and
procedural safeguards to protect Customer Information.
. . . .
. . . All companies that act on our behalf are contractually
obligated to keep the information we provide to them
confidential . . . .152
A customer reading this information would conclude, at a minimum, that in
exchange for entrusting the bank with personal information, the bank agreed (1) to
protect the data by means of physical, electronic, and procedural safeguards and (2)
to keep it confidential. Other language in the privacy policy reinforces those
sensible conclusions by stressing the importance of precautions on the part of the
customer to guard against disclosure or unauthorized use of account and personal
information.153 The same is true of statements in the bank’s advertising154 and on
its website emphasizing the dangers of identity theft and assuring the customer that
“[y]our checking account statements are always protected in Online Banking.”155
A court might reasonably interpret such a privacy policy as an undertaking to
exercise reasonable care, and might conclude that a breach of that duty would
support a tort cause of action.
Similarly, even if the plaintiff never read or relied on the institution’s privacy
policy, a court might impose a duty of care under the other prong of the undertaking
rule, which says where services provided for the protection of another increase the
risk of harm “beyond that which existed without the undertaking,” there is a duty
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156.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 42(a) (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005) (discussing increased risk of harm).
157.  See id. § 42 cmt. a.
158.  See PulseCard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1478, 1484 (D. Kan. 1996)
(stating that “[t]he hallmark of a fiduciary relationship is a voluntary and conscious assumption or
acceptance of the duties of a fiduciary”).
159.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 cmt. a (1979) (stating that “[a] fiduciary
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161.  See Vincent R. Johnson, “Absolute and Perfect Candor” to Clients, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 737,
792 (2003) [hereinafter Candor] (indicating that if the interests of lawyer and client diverge, the
lawyer’s duty is essentially one of absolute and perfect candor).
162.  Fiduciary-duty principles come from many areas of the law, including the rules governing
trusts, corporations, and agency. At least in some contexts, a breach of fiduciary duty is treated as a type
of tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979) (stating that “[o]ne standing in a fiduciary
relation with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed
by the relation”).
to exercise reasonable care.156 Depending on the facts, the measures taken to protect
computerized data (e.g., use of passwords and firewalls) may contain flaws that
increase the risk of unauthorized data access. An increased risk of harm might also
result when data protection practices allow transmission of unencrypted data, which
is especially vulnerable to hacking. The increased-risk rule might apply in these
types of cases.
According to the Restatement provision on undertakings, negligence liability
based on inducing detrimental reliance or increasing the risk of injury is limited to
compensation for physical harm.157 This significant limitation presumably means
that the economic losses associated with identity theft are not recoverable under this
theory of duty. However, a database possessor might still be liable under the
undertaking rule for personal injury or property damage perpetrated on a data
subject by an intruder or one who obtained personal information from the intruder.
D. Fiduciary Obligations
A fiduciary is one who voluntarily158 holds a position of special trust and
confidence that obliges the fiduciary to act in the best interest of another.159 The
duties imposed on a fiduciary—including loyalty, candor, and confidentiality—are
sometimes coextensive with those that the law of negligence embraces.160 However,
depending on the circumstances, fiduciary obligations may extend considerably
further than a duty of reasonable care.161
If a database possessor owes fiduciary obligations to a data subject, it is
reasonable to argue that regardless of whether general tort principles would impose
a duty, the fiduciary is obliged to protect computerized information relating to the
data subject from unauthorized access by third parties.162 For example, the
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163.  See, e.g., Keywell Corp. v. Piper & Marbury, L.L.P., No. 96-CV-066OE (SC), 1999 WL
66700, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1999) (stating that “[i]t is axiomatic that the relationship between an
attorney and his or her client is a fiduciary one”).
164.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2000) (providing that
“[c]onfidential client information consists of information relating to representation of a client, other than
information that is generally known”).
165.  See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 782 (2004) (“When a lawyer
sends a document by e-mail, as with any other type of communication, a lawyer must exercise
reasonable care to ensure that he or she does not inadvertently disclose his or her client’s confidential
information. . . . Reasonable care may, in some circumstances, call for the lawyer to stay abreast of
technological advances and the potential risks in transmission in order to make an appropriate decision
with respect to the mode of transmission.”). See generally David Hricik, The Speed of Normal:
Conflicts, Competency, and Confidentiality in the Digital Age, 9 COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. ____
(forthcoming 2005) (discussing ethical obligations of attorneys relating to digitally stored client
confidences);  Jonathan Bick, Client Internet Services Expose Firms to New Liability, N.J. L.J., Sept.
20, 2004, available at http://www.bicklaw.com/Publications/Client_internet_to_Liability.htm
(indicating that client services now include “offering clients protected access to their personal case
information over the Internet” and stating that “ethical rules . . . [are] equally applicable to Internet
transactions”).
166.  See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 643 (1993) (stating that client “files
should be stored in a secure location”).
167.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. d (2000) (“A
lawyer who acquires confidential client information has a duty to take reasonable steps to secure the
information against misuse or inappropriate disclosure . . . . This requires that client confidential
information be acquired, stored, retrieved, and transmitted under systems and controls that are
reasonably designed and managed to maintain confidentiality.”); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398 (1995) (“A lawyer who gives a computer maintenance
company access to information in client files must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the company
has in place, or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of client
information.”); cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 99-413 (1999)
(“Lawyers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications made by all forms of e-mail,
including unencrypted e-mail sent on the Internet, despite some risk of interception and
disclosure. . . . [and] therefore . . . its use is consistent with the duty . . . to use reasonable means to
maintain the confidentiality of information relating to a client’s representation.”).
168.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 44 (2000) (discussing the
duty to safeguard and segregate client property).
relationship between an attorney and client is fiduciary as a matter of law.163
Accordingly, lawyers have a special fiduciary obligation to protect confidential
client information, aside from any demands imposed by ordinary tort principles. A
lawyer’s broad fiduciary obligation of confidentiality extends to all forms of
information about the client,164 including computerized data,165 as well as
information contained in printed documents or otherwise known by the attorney,166
for the existence of the duty turns on the content, and not the form, of the
information.167 In light of the fiduciary-duty rules on confidentiality (and the related
obligations requiring safekeeping of client property168), a lawyer or law firm could
not plausibly argue that there is no duty to safeguard computerized client data from
intruders.
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169.  Cf. PulseCard, Inc. v. Discover Card Servs., Inc., 917 F. Supp. 1478, 1484 (D. Kan. 1996)
(stating that “almost every fiduciary relationship implies some duty of confidentiality”).
170.  See id. at 1483 (discussing fiduciary relationships “specifically created by contract such as
principal/agent, attorney/client, and trustee/cestui que trust”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874
cmt. b (1979) (referring to trustee, guardian, executor, and administrator).
171.  See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409, 429 (2d Cir.
1999) (holding that “irrespective of the duties of the Diocese to its parishioners generally, the jury could
reasonably have found that the Diocese’s relationship with [the plaintiff] . . . was of a fiduciary nature”);
Curl v. Key, 316 S.E.2d 272, 274–76 (N.C. 1984) (reversing and remanding a lower court’s
determination that a confidential relationship did not exist where the defendant, who the plaintiffs
referred to as “uncle” and who was the best friend of their deceased father, secured the plaintiffs’
signatures on a “peace paper”); Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. v. Crim Truck & Tractor Co., 791 S.W.2d
241, 242 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (indicating that informal relationships may be fiduciary).
172.  See, e.g., PulseCard, Inc., 917 F. Supp. at 1484, 1488 (stating that “fiduciary obligations
should be extended reluctantly to commercial or business transactions” and holding that a relationship
between a credit card company and a provider of transaction processing services was not fiduciary).
173.  See Pellegrini v. Cliffwood-Blue Moon Joint Venture, Inc., 115 S.W.3d 577, 580 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2003) (characterizing the relationship between a geophysicist contractor and a joint venture as an
arm’s-length transaction).
174.  PulseCard, Inc., 917 F. Supp. at 1485.
175.  See Navistar, 791 S.W.2d at 243.
176.  See Ho v. Univ. of Tex. at Arlington, 984 S.W.2d 672, 693 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (holding
there is no fiduciary relationship “between teachers and students in a normal educational setting”).
177.  See Brzica v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 791 A.2d 990, 994–95 (N.H. 2002) (holding the facts
did not establish a fiduciary relationship between college trustees and alumni).
178.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West Supp. 2005) (specifying a duty to “implement and
maintain reasonable security procedures and practices”); id. § 1798.82(a) (imposing a duty to disclose
“any breach of security of the system”).
The same analysis should apply to all fiduciary relationships,169 including those
that are fiduciary as a matter of law (such as trustee-beneficiary170) and others that
are fiduciary as a matter of fact because they entail a high degree of trust and
confidence.171 Importantly, however, ordinary business relationships are not
fiduciary.172 In business, parties normally deal with one another at arm’s length.173
The “mere acceptance of confidential information” does not create a fiduciary
relationship,174 nor does the fact that one party “trusts another and relies on a
promise to carry out a contract.”175 Fiduciary relationships are the exception, not the
rule. Even the relationship between a teacher and a student,176 or a university and
its alumni,177 is usually not fiduciary in nature. Consequently, while fiduciary-duty
law may play an important role in determining whether professionals—such as
lawyers, physicians, or trustees—have a duty to protect the information of clients,
patients, and beneficiaries from intruders, it will not set the standard of care in most
commercial settings.
III. THE DUTY TO REVEAL EVIDENCE OF SECURITY BREACHES
It is important to distinguish the duty to protect data from intrusion from the
duty to disclose information regarding an actual breach in data security. A statute
might impose both of these obligations (as does California’s SBIA),178 or it might
impose one duty but not the other. For example, the Louisiana Database Security
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179.  Database Security Breach Notification Law, ch. 51, §§ 3071-77, 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv.
(West), available at LA LEGIS 499 (2005) (Westlaw).
180.  Id. § 3074(A).
181.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005).
182.  See infra Part III.B.3.
183.  See infra Part III.A.
184.  See infra Part III.B.1.
185.  See infra Part III.B.2.
186.  See infra Part III.B.3.
187.  See supra note 29.
188.  See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1702(1)(a), -1704(1)–(2) (2005) (imposing a
notification obligation on “[a]ny person or business that conducts business” and defining a business as
“a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, association, or other group, however organized and
whether or not organized to operate at a profit, including a financial institution . . . or the parent or the
subsidiary of a financial institution.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (Supp. 2005) (imposing a
notification obligation on “[a]ny person that conducts business”). But see GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 10-1-911(2), –912(a) (Supp. 2005) (limiting the obligation to “information brokers,” who are “any
person or entity who, for monetary fees or dues, engages in whole or in part in the business of
collecting, assembling, evaluating, compiling, reporting, transmitting, transferring, or communicating
information concerning individuals for the primary purpose of furnishing personal information to
nonaffiliated third parties,” and not including “any governmental agency whose records are maintained
Breach Notification Law179 does not create an explicit duty to protect data, but
requires notification of data subjects upon discovery of a security breach.180 In
addition, common law rules may distinguish the duty to disclose from the duty to
protect. Under certain rules, one whose conduct, “even though not tortious, creates
a continuing risk of physical harm” to the plaintiff “has a duty to exercise
reasonable care” to prevent the harm from occurring or to minimize the adverse
consequences.181 Even if a database possessor was not under a duty enforceable in
a private action to protect a data subject’s personal information from unauthorized
access, an intrusion may impose a duty on the database possessor to reveal the
breach in security.182
There are at least four ways of imposing on potential defendants a duty to
reveal a compromise in database security. First, a statute may impose a duty, either
as a result of the statute’s express terms or as a result of judicial reliance on the
statute as the proper expression of the standard of care.183 Second, a duty may arise
from common law principles governing negligence liability generally.184 Third,
there may be a duty under law of misrepresentation, which imposes a general duty
to update previously accurate statements (e.g., statements relating to data security)
that are the basis for pending or continuing reliance by the recipient of the
statements.185 Finally, failure-to-act rules may require the exercise of reasonable
care to avoid or minimize damages if a database possessor’s conduct created a
continuing risk of physical harm.186
A. Statutory Duties
At least eighteen states187 have adopted database security breach information
acts that require certain types of database possessors (typically businesses,188 but
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primarily for traffic safety, law enforcement, or licensing purposes”); Act to Protect Maine Citizens
from Identity Theft, ch. 379, sec. 1, § 1348(1), 2005 Me. Legis. Serv. (West), available at ME LEGIS
379 (Westlaw) (limiting the notification duty to information brokers). Some businesses may be exempt
from state law obligations imposed on businesses generally. See, e.g., Database Security Breach
Notification Law, ch. 51, § 3076, 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at LA LEGIS 499 (2005)
(Westlaw) (exempting financial institutions that are subject to, and in compliance with, certain federal
rules).
189.  See, e.g., Act effective July 1, 2005, Pub. L. No. 91-2005, ch. 10, 11, sec. 1, 2, §§ 4-1-10-2,
-11-5(a), 2005 Ind. Legis. Serv. (West), available at IN LEGIS 91-2005 (2005) (Westlaw) (limiting the
notification obligation to state agencies, including state educational institutions); Act of June 17, 2005,
ch. 486, sec. 2, 6, §§ 4(1), 6(1), 2005 Nev. Stat., available at NV LEGIS 486 (Westlaw) (imposing a
duty on governmental agencies and applying separate provisions to persons “doing business”); Act of
June 17, 2005, ch. 485, sec. 16, § 24, 2005 Nev. Stat., available at NV LEGIS 485 (2005) (Westlaw)
(imposing a notification duty on “data collector”); Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005,
ch. 225, sec. 1, §§ 11-49.2-3(A), 11-49.2-5(A), 2005 R.I. Gen. Laws Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis),
available at 2005 R.I. ALS 225 (LexisNexis) (requiring that “[a]ny state agency or person that owns,
maintains or licenses computerized data” provide notification, and defining “person” as “any individual,
partnership association, corporation or joint venture”); Act of May 10, 2005, ch. 368, §§ 1(1)(a), 2(1),
2005 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West), available at WA LEGIS 368 (2005) (Westlaw) (imposing a
notification obligation on governmental agencies and placing a similar obligation on “[a]ny person or
business that conducts business in the state” through other provisions).
190.  See Personal Information Protection Act, Pub. Act 94-36, ch. 815, sec. 530, §§ 5, 10(a)-(b),
2005 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West), available at IL LEGIS 94-36 (2005) (Westlaw) (imposing a notification
obligation on a “data collector,” which “may include, but is not limited to, government agencies, public
and private universities, privately and publicly held corporations, financial institutions, retail operators,
and any other entity that, for any purpose, handles, collects, disseminates, or otherwise deals with
nonpublic personal information”); Act effective July 1, 2005, ch. 473, sec. 1, §§ 47-18-2107(a)(2), -
2107(b), 2005-2 Tenn. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 749, 749-50 (LexisNexis) (imposing a notification
duty on an “information holder,” which includes “any person or business that conducts business in this
state, or any agency of the State of Tennessee or any of its political subdivisions”).
191.  Act of June 28, 2005, Pub. L. 61, sec. 1, §§ 12B-101(2), 12B-102, 2005 Del. Code Ann. Adv.
Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis), available at 2005 Del. ALS 61 (LexisNexis) (imposing a notification
obligation on a “‘commercial entity’ . . . whether for profit or not-for-profit”).
192.  Act of June 14, 2005, ch. 2005-229, sec. 2, § 817.5681(1)(a), 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
(West), available at FL LEGIS 2005-229 (Westlaw) (imposing a notification obligation when any
resident’s personal information “was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an
unauthorized person”); Act effective July 1, 2005, Pub. L. No. 91-2005, ch. 10, sec. 2, § 4-1-11-5(a),
2005 Ind. Legis. Serv. (West), available at IN LEGIS 91-2005 (2005) (Westlaw).
193.  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(b) (West Supp. 2005) (stating that “[a] customer injured by
a violation of this title may institute a civil action to recover damages”); Database Security Breach
Notification Law, ch. 51, § 3075, 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at LA LEGIS 499 (2005)
(Westlaw) (providing that “[a] civil action may be instituted to recover actual damages resulting from
the failure to disclose in a timely manner to a person that there has been a breach of the security system
resulting in the disclosure of a person’s personal information.”); Act of June 17, 2005, ch. 486, sec. 2,
§ 4(5), 2005 Nev. Stat., available at NV LEGIS 486 (2005) (Westlaw) (providing that “[a] person who
has suffered injury as the proximate result of a violation of this section may commence an action against
the governmental agency for the recovery of his actual damages, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees,”
subject to limitations); id. § 6(7) (“A person who has suffered injury as the proximate result of a
violation of this section may commence an action against the person doing business in this State for the
sometimes governmental agencies189 or other persons or entities,190 such as non-
profit organizations191) to notify data subjects of violations (or possible violations)
of their information’s security.192 Several of the states that impose notification
obligations expressly authorize a civil action for damages.193 In addition, Illinois
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recovery of his actual damages, costs and reasonable attorney’s fees and, if the violation of this section
was willful or intentional, for any punitive damages that the facts may warrant.”); Act effective July 1,
2005, ch. 473, sec. 1, § 47-18-2107(h), 2005-2 Tenn. Code Ann. Adv. Legis. Serv. 749, 751
(LexisNexis) (“Any customer of an information holder who is a person or business entity, but who is
not an agency of the state or any political subdivision of the state, and who is injured by a violation of
this section may institute a civil action to recover damages . . . .”); Act of May 10, 2005, ch. 368, §§
1(10)(a), 2(10)(a), 2005 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West), available at WA LEGIS 368 (2005) (Westlaw)
(providing that “[a]ny customer injured by a violation of this section may institute a civil action to
recover damages”).
194.  Personal Information Protection Act, Pub. Act 94-36, ch. 815, sec. 530, § 20, 2005 Ill. Legis.
Serv. (West), available at IL LEGIS 94-36 (2005) (Westlaw) (“A violation of this Act constitutes an
unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act.”).
195.  815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/10a(a) (West Supp. 2005).
196.  Id. at 505/10a(c).
197.  See Act of June 14, 2005, ch. 2005-229, sec. 2, § 817.5681(1)(b), 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
(West), available at FL LEGIS 2005-229 (Westlaw) (“Any person required to make notification . . .
who fails to do so within 45 days . . . is liable for an administrative fine not to exceed $500,000, as
follows:  1. In the amount of $1,000 for each day the breach goes undisclosed for up to 30 days and,
thereafter, $50,000 for each 30-day period or portion thereof for up to 180 days. 2. If notification is not
made within 180 days, any person required to make notification under paragraph (a) who fails to do so
is subject to an administrative fine up to $500,000.”); id. § 817.5681(1)(c) (“The administrative
sanctions for failure to notify provided in this subsection shall apply per breach and not per individual
affected by the breach.”); id. § 817.5681(1)(d) (providing that the administrative sanctions generally
do not apply against “any governmental agency or subdivision”).
198.  See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-1705(3), -103, -142 (Supp. 2005) (providing that violations
constitute deceptive trade practices subject to injunctive relief and civil fines); Rhode Island Identity
Theft Protection Act of 2005, ch. 225, sec. 1, § 11-49.2-6(A), 2005 R.I. Gen. Laws Adv. Legis. Serv.
(LexisNexis), available at 2005 R.I. ALS 225 (LexisNexis) (“Each violation of this chapter is a civil
violation for which a penalty of not more than a hundred dollars ($ 100) per occurrence and not more
than twenty-five thousand dollars ($ 25,000) may be adjudged against a defendant.”).
199.  See Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 167, sec. 1, § 6, 2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available
at MN LEGIS 167 (2005) (Westlaw) (providing that “[t]he attorney general shall enforce this section”).
200.  See Act of June 28, 2005, Pub. Act 61, sec. 1, § 12B-104, 2005 Del. Code Ann. Adv. Legis.
Serv. (LexisNexis), available at 2005 Del. ALS 61 (LexisNexis) (“[T]he Attorney General may bring
an action in law or equity to . . . ensure proper compliance with this chapter or to recover direct
economic damages resulting from a violation, or both.”).
201.  See Act of June 24, 2005, Pub. Act 05-148, § 3(g), 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv. (West), available
at CT LEGIS P.A. 05-148 (Westlaw) (providing, apparently as the sole remedy, that “[f]ailure to
comply with the requirements of this section shall constitute an unfair trade practice . . . and shall be
enforced by the Attorney General”); see also 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/3 to 505/7 (West 1999
& Supp. 2005) (describing the powers of the Illinois Attorney General). 
202.  See supra Part II.B (discussing general principles of negligence per se).
allows a deceptive trade practices action,194 which permits a “person who suffers
actual damage . . . [to recover] actual economic damages or any other relief which
the court deems proper,”195 including “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”196 In
other states, a variety of means enforce the notification obligation, such as
administrative197 or civil198 fines, or an action by the attorney general199 to recover
“direct economic damages”200 or to remedy deceptive trade practices.201
In states not expressly providing for civil liability to data subjects, an individual
may be able to rely upon a notification statute that does not expressly create a
private right of action as the basis for a suit alleging negligence per se.202 State
security breach notification laws, unlike the federal GLBA and related
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203.  See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the federal GLBA and related regulations).
204.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105 (West Supp. 2005) (detailing the acceptability of
various methods of providing notice, including written notice, e-mail notice, and types of “[s]ubstitute
notice”).
205.  See Act of June 28, 2005, Pub. Act 61, sec. 1, § 12B-103, 2005 Del. Code Ann. Adv. Legis.
Serv. (LexisNexis), available at 2005 Del. ALS 61 (LexisNexis) (“[A]n individual or a commercial
entity that maintains its own notice procedures as part of an information security policy for the treatment
of personal information, and whose procedures are otherwise consistent with the timing requirements
of this chapter is deemed to be in compliance with the notice requirements of this chapter if the
individual or the commercial entity notifies affected Delaware residents in accordance with its policies
in the event of a breach of security of the system.”); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(3) (Supp.
2005) (containing similar language).
206.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-912(c) (Supp. 2005) (providing that notification “may be
delayed if a law enforcement agency determines that the notification will compromise a criminal
investigation” and “shall be made after the law enforcement agency determines that it will not
compromise the investigation”).
207.  Pub. Act 94-36, ch. 815, sec. 530, 2005 Ill. Legis. Serv. (West), available at IL LEGIS 94-36
(2005) (Westlaw).
208.  Id. § 10(a) (emphasis added).
209.  Act of June 24, 2005, Pub. Act 05-148, § 3(b), 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv. (West), available
at CT LEGIS P.A. 05-148 (Westlaw).
210.  Act of June 14, 2005, ch. 2005-229, sec. 2, § 817.5681(10)(a), 2005 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
(West), available at FL LEGIS 2005-229 (Westlaw); see also id. § 817.5681(10)(b) (“Any person
[who] . . . fails to maintain the documentation for the full 5 years as required in this subsection is liable
for an administrative fine in the amount of up to $50,000 for such failure.”).
regulations,203 may be sufficiently specific to avoid allegations that they are too
vague to set the standard of care. These laws require prompt action and typically
spell out in detail how database possessors should provide notification.204 However,
the laws do allow some flexibility. 
State notification statutes often permit database possessors to adopt their own
notification procedures that comply with the notice and timing requirements of the
statute.205 They also allow for a delay in notification to accommodate the needs of
law enforcement206 or other important considerations. For example, the Illinois
Personal Information Protection Act207 requires that “notification shall be made in
the most expedient time possible and without unreasonable delay, consistent with
any measures necessary to determine the scope of the breach and restore the
reasonable integrity, security, and confidentiality of the data system.”208 However,
this type of language does not question whether a duty exists, but simply allows for
a nuanced analysis of whether there has been a breach.
More importantly, some of the security breach notification laws create
unlikelihood-of-harm exceptions to the disclosure obligation. For example, the
Connecticut law states that “notification shall not be required if, after an appropriate
investigation and consultation with relevant federal, state and local agencies
responsible for law enforcement, the person reasonably determines that the breach
will not likely result in harm to the individuals whose personal information has
been acquired and accessed.”209 The Florida law requires the determination to “be
documented in writing and the documentation must be maintained for 5 years.”210
These types of exceptions limit the utility of a negligence per se analysis in some
states. Under this type of law, a defendant’s reasonable determination that there was
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211.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 15 cmts. a–b (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing the role of excuse in negligence per se generally).
212.  Notice of Risk to Personal Data Act, ch. 379, sec. 1, § 1346, 2005 Me. Legis. Serv. (West),
available at ME LEGIS 379 (2005) (Westlaw).
213.  Id. § 1349(2)(A)-(C) (providing that a violation may result in “A. A fine of not more than
$500 per violation, up to a maximum of $2,500 for each day the information broker is in violation of
this chapter; B. Equitable relief; or C. Enjoinment from further violations”).
214.  See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-07 (Supp. 2005) (providing that the “attorney general
may enforce this chapter,” but that the “remedies, duties, prohibitions, and penalties of this chapter are
not exclusive and are in addition to all other causes of action, remedies, and penalties . . . or otherwise
provided by law”).
215.  Notice of Risk to Personal Data Act, ch. 379, sec. 1, § 1349(3), 2005 Me. Legis. Serv.
(West), available at ME LEGIS 379 (2005) (Westlaw).
216.  S. 115, 109th Cong. (2005).
217.  Id. § 5.
218.  Id. § 3(b)(3).
219.  Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1332, 109th Cong. (2005).
220.  Id. § 401(b).
221.  Id. § 402.
222.  Id. §§ 421–22.
223.  Id. §§ 403(b)(1)(c).
no likelihood of harm would presumably mean either that there was no violation of
the statute as a result of non-disclosure of a security breach, or that there was an
excuse for any violation that occurred.211 Either finding would be fatal to a
negligence per se action.
Some state notification statutes not expressly providing for civil liability, such
as the Maine Notice of Risk to Personal Data Act,212 appear to leave room for courts
to entertain negligence per se actions by ruling out arguments that legislatures
intended the statutorily created penalties213 to be the sole measure of a database
possessor’s obligations.214 The Maine Act states that “rights and remedies available
under [the statute] are cumulative and do not affect or prevent rights and remedies
available under federal or state law.”215
At the federal level, Senator Dianne Feinstein has introduced legislation that
would “require Federal agencies, and persons engaged in interstate commerce, in
possession of electronic data containing personal information, to disclose any
unauthorized acquisition of such information.”216 That bill, if adopted, would
preempt inconsistent state legislation217 but does not expressly provide that
adversely affected data subjects can maintain a civil action to recover damages.218
Another bill,219 proposed by Senator Arlen Specter, would subject businesses
maintaining records relating to 10,000 or more persons220 to certain data
protection221 and breach notification requirements,222 and, among other enforcement
mechanisms, would allow a state attorney general to maintain an action in federal
court to recover “in the sum of actual damages, restitution, and other compensation
on behalf of affected residents of a State; and . . . punitive damages, if the violation
is willful or intentional.”223
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224.  See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
225.  However, the defendant may indirectly benefit, such as by protecting its reputation through
candor.
226.  See, e.g., Act of June 28, 2005, Pub. Act 61, sec. 1, § 12B-101(4), 2005 Del. Code Ann. Adv.
Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis), available at 2005 Del. ALS 61 (LexisNexis) (“‘[N]otice’ means:  (i) written
notice; (ii) telephonic notice; (iii) electronic notice, if the notice provided is consistent with [certain
federal laws]; or (iv) substitute notice, if the individual or the commercial entity required to provide
notice demonstrates that the cost of providing notice will exceed $75,000, or that the affected class of
Delaware residents to be notified exceeds 100,000 residents, or that the individual or the commercial
entity does not have sufficient contact information to provide notice. Substitute notice consists of all
of the following:  a. e-mail notice . . . ; and b. conspicuous posting of the notice on the Web site page
of the individual or the commercial entity if the individual or the commercial entity maintains one; and
c. notice to major statewide media.”).
227.  “In some situations a warning is desirable because it is effective in reducing the likelihood
of an accident. Yet in other situations a warning is appropriate mainly because it reduces the likely
severity of the injuries that such an accident might occasion.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB.
B. Basic Tort Principles
1. General Duty or Limited Duty
Part II.C discussed how general tort principles and policies can be marshaled
to support judicial recognition of a duty to protect database information. Many of
those same arguments—particularly the reasoning relating to foreseeability of
danger, opportunity to prevent harm, relationship between the parties (at least in
business contexts), deterrence of future losses, desirable community consequences,
and the availability of insurance—have equal application to the question of whether
a database possessor has a duty to disclose intrusion to data subjects. Those policies
favor judicial recognition of a notification duty. However, determining whether the
burden placed on the defendant would be too heavy to bear requires special
consideration because the costs of providing notice will obviously differ from the
costs of protecting a computer database.
Depending on the number of affected data subjects, the costs of notification
may be substantial. Some breaches of security involve a risk to tens or hundreds of
thousands of persons.224 Notifying each of the affected individuals separately may
be difficult, time consuming, and labor intensive. In addition, unlike the costs of
database protection, the expense of notification does not directly benefit the
database possessor.225 Indeed, disclosure of the breach may precipitate adverse
publicity and loss of business.
The states that have passed security breach notification laws have shown how
to minimize the burden imposed on database possessors in some contexts through
the use of alternate modes of notification.226 The same type of alternatives—which
allow for aggregate methods of communication when personal notice would be too
expensive or otherwise infeasible—should be taken into account in determining
whether to impose a common law notification duty and, if so, whether a database
possessor has breached that duty.
A key question in determining whether to require notification is whether
disclosure of the breach would be useful227 or futile.228 If a data subject could not
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FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 18 cmt. b (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
228.  The Restatement indicates:
In some situations, however, there is little or nothing a potential victim can do
even if given a warning. For example, if a golfer’s errant shot heads in the
direction of a freeway next to the golf course, it would be pointless for the golfer
to give a “fore” warning to motorists on the freeway . . . .
Id.
229.  Cf. FDA CONSUMER, supra note 8 (discussing what individuals should do if they think their
identity has been stolen).
230.  Pub. L. No. 108–159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
Titles 15 and 20 of the United States Code).
231.  15 U.S.C.A. § 1681c-1 (West Supp. 2005).
232.  Act of May 9, 2005, ch. 342, § 1(1), 2005 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West), available at WA
LEGIS 368 (2005) (Westlaw). “The consumer reporting agency . . . shall provide the consumer with
a unique personal identification number or password to be used by the consumer when providing
authorization for the release of his or her credit report for a specific party or period of time.” Id. § 1(4).
See also Act of June 24, 2005, Pub. Act 05-148, § 2, 2005 Conn. Legis. Serv. (West), available at CT
LEGIS P.A. 05-148 (Westlaw) (detailing security freeze procedures).
233.  See Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act, ch. 294, sec. 2, § 48.202, 2005 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. (West), available at 2005 TX LEGIS 294 (2005) (Westlaw) (detailing the process to declare
an individual a victim of identity theft).
234.  See Kathleen Pender, Credit Reports—Free for All, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 30, 2004, at C4
(describing Experian’s “credit-monitoring product, called Triple Alert,” that provides customers with
“same-day notification anytime someone seeks credit in their name”).
235.  But see Hayes v. State, 521 P.2d 855, 858 (Cal. 1974) (holding that there was no duty to warn
students of the risk of an attack on the beach at night because “the public is aware of the incidence of
violent crime, particularly in unlit and little used places” and “it would serve little purpose . . . to further
remind the public of this unfortunate circumstance in society”).
do anything to protect his or her own interests following an intrusion into data
security, there would be little reason to require notification. However, individuals
can act to protect themselves from financial and physical harm that persons with
unauthorized access to their data may cause.229 The federal Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA)230 allows consumers to place a “fraud alert”231
in the their files with credit reporting agencies. Certain state laws also enable
consumers to place a “security freeze” on their credit report, which “prohibits the
consumer reporting agency from releasing the consumer’s credit report or any
information from it without the express authorization of the consumer.”232 Some
state laws permit victims of information security breaches to obtain a court order
declaring the individual a victim of identity theft.233 That declaration can aid the
data subject in dealing with law enforcement authorities or with businesses.
Consumers can also monitor their credit card and bank accounts more closely for
evidence of unauthorized transactions or pay monthly service fees to a company
that tracks three national credit reporting companies on a daily basis and advises
subscribers of key changes to their data (such as new applications for credit by
someone using the subscriber’s name and identity).234 As to physical harm, a person
who has notice of a data intrusion can exercise greater caution for personal safety,
if the facts so warrant.235
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236.  “The range of defendant conduct that can give rise to the obligation to warn is so broad as
to make clear that the failure to warn is a basic form of negligence.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 18 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (offering diverse examples).
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) (1998) (discussing product liability
based on failure to warn); id. § 10(a) (“One engaged in the business of selling . . . products is subject
to liability for harm . . . caused by the seller’s failure to provide a warning after the time of sale . . . if
a reasonable person in the seller’s position would provide such a warning.”).
237.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 342 cmt. d (1965) (“[T]he licensee . . . is entitled
to expect nothing more than a disclosure of the conditions which he will meet if he . . . enters, in so far
as those conditions are known to the giver of the privilege.”).
238.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 41 reporter’s note to
cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“Some courts have declined to adopt a duty beyond that of
warning. A substantial number of courts, and legislatures enacting statutes, limit the duty to warning
the potential victim.”).
239.  If a court imposes a duty to warn as a matter of common law principles, there are many open
questions relating to the method for conveying the warning and the specificity of the message. In the
absence of a governing statute, the courts will determine whether the database possessor acted
reasonably on a case-by-case basis. However, attorneys advising clients on what they must do to avoid
liability might do well to keep in mind that the Interagency Guidance states:
If the institution determines that misuse of its information about a customer has
occurred or is reasonably possible, it should notify the affected customer as soon
as possible. Customer notice may be delayed if an appropriate law enforcement
agency determines that notification will interfere with a criminal investigation and
provides the institution with a written request for the delay. However, the
institution should notify its customers as soon as notification will no longer
interfere with the investigation.
Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and
Customer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, 15,732 (Mar. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Interagency Guidance].
240.  See id. at 15,751–53 (setting forth guidance jointly issued by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, interpreting the GLBA and related provisions).  The
Interagency Guidance opines that financial institutions have a duty to notify customers of a breach of
data security. See id. at 15,752 (providing that “[w]here an incident of unauthorized access to customer
information involves customer information systems maintained by an institution’s service providers,
it is the responsibility of the financial institution to notify the institution’s customers and regulator”).
In many circumstances, American tort law has imposed liability for failure to
warn.236 Indeed, courts have sometimes held there is a duty to warn even when there
is no duty to do anything else. For example, in many states that still follow the
traditional categories relating to premises liability—trespasser, licensee, and
invitee—the only duty a possessor of land owes to a licensee is to warn of dangers
of which the possessor is aware.237 Similarly, in some states, essentially the only
duty of a mental health professional who knows that a patient poses a risk of harm
to a third person is to warn the third person (or authorities) of the danger.238
Consequently, it might reasonably follow that even if a state holds there is no duty
to protect databases from intrusion, there should at least be a duty to provide notice
of a security breach of the database.239
An important question remains as to how specific the notice should be that
informs data subjects of unauthorized data access. In this regard, the federal
Interagency Guidance240 for financial institutions offers an informative, pro-
consumer perspective. The Interagency Guidance states:
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241.  Id. at 15,752–53. More specifically, the document provides:
The notice should include the following additional items, when appropriate:
a. A recommendation that the customer review account statements and
immediately report any suspicious activity to the institution;
b. A description of fraud alerts and an explanation of how the customer may
place a fraud alert in the customer’s consumer reports to put the customer’s
creditors on notice that the customer may be a victim of fraud;
c. A recommendation that the customer periodically obtain credit reports
from each nationwide credit reporting agency and have information relating to
fraudulent transactions deleted;
d. An explanation of how the customer may obtain a credit report free of
charge; and
e. Information about the availability of the FTC’s online guidance regarding
steps a consumer can take to protect against identity theft. The notice should
encourage the customer to report any incidents of identity theft to the FTC, and
should provide the FTC’s Web site address and toll-free telephone number that
customers may use to obtain the identity theft guidance and report suspected
incidents of identity theft.
Id. at 15,753. The Interagency Guidance adds:
Customer notice should be delivered in any manner designed to ensure that
a customer can reasonably be expected to receive it. For example, the institution
may choose to contact all customers affected by telephone or by mail, or by
electronic mail for those customers for whom it has a valid e-mail address and
who have agreed to receive communications electronically.
Id. at 15,753.
242.  See Sharff v. Pioneer Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 92 C 20034, 1993 WL 87718, *6–7 (N.D. Ill Mar.
22, 1993) (recognizing the rule and holding a question of fact existed as to whether the defendant failed
to correct a representation that the plaintiff would be given a performance review); Stevens v. Marco,
305 P.2d 669, 683 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (stating that “one who learns that his statements, even if
thought to be true when made, have become false through a change in circumstances, has the duty,
before his statements are acted upon, to disclose the new conditions to the party relying on his original
representations”); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co., 316 N.E.2d 51, 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)
(stating that “where one has made a statement which at that time is true but subsequently acquires new
Customer notice should be given in a clear and conspicuous
manner. The notice should describe the incident in general terms
and the type of customer information that was the subject of
unauthorized access or use. It also should generally describe what
the institution has done to protect the customers’ information
from further unauthorized access. In addition, it should include a
telephone number that customers can call for further information
and assistance. The notice also should remind customers of the
need to remain vigilant over the next twelve to twenty-four
months, and to promptly report incidents of suspected identity
theft to the institution.241
2. The Obligation to Correct Previous Statements
There is a duty to update previous statements that were intended to induce
reliance and that, though true when made, have become false or misleading as a
result of subsequent developments.242 The duty extends until recipients of the
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information which makes it untrue or misleading, he must disclose such information to anyone whom
he knows to be acting on the basis of the original statement—or be guilty of fraud or deceit”); McMahan
v. Greenwood, 108 S.W.3d 467, 494 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that an attorney had a duty “to correct
any misimpressions caused by his earlier statements”); 2 FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. &
OSCAR S. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.14, at 476 (2d ed. 1986); see also First Nat’l Bank of Elgin
v. Nilles, 35 B.R. 409, 411 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (“[O]ne who makes an incorrect statement he has reason to
believe another is relying upon is under a duty to correct it.”).
243.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. h (1977) (providing that “[o]ne who,
having made a representation which when made was true or believed to be so, remains silent after he
has learned that it is untrue and that the person to whom it is made is relying upon it in a transaction
with him, is morally and legally in the same position as if he knew that his statement was false when
made” (emphasis added)).
244.  651 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying California law).
245.  Id. at 462.
246.  Id. at 462–63.
247.  Id. at 463.
248.  Id. at 461.
249.  Id. at 468.
250.  McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 468 (7th Cir. 1981) (quoting Black v.
Shearson, Harrill & Co., 72 Cal. Rptr. 157, 160 (Ct. App. 1968)).
251.  See supra text accompanying notes 151–55.
252.  Cf. Thomas J. Smedinghoff, Trends in the Law of Information Security, 2 CIPARETI (A.B.A.
Chicago, Ill.), Mar. 2005, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/committees/CL320010pub/
newsletter/0006/index.html (stating that “government enforcement agencies such as the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) have actively pursued companies for ‘deceptive’ trade practices whenever the
information security representations they voluntarily make to the public do not match their actual
security practices”).
information are no longer able to protect their own interests by foregoing reliance
on the now-erroneous representation of the fact.243 The purpose of the rule is to
avoid deception that causes harm.
McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp.244 illustrates the operation of this rule in
another context. In that case, the defendants told the plaintiff executive that he was
the “heir apparent” to the presidency of a soon-to-be-acquired subsidiary.245
However, before the plaintiff released his shares of stock and options to facilitate
the acquisition, the defendants learned there were serious doubts as to whether the
plaintiff would ever become president,246 but did not disclose those developments
to the plaintiff.247 In an opinion by Chief Judge Thomas E. Fairchild, the Seventh
Circuit upheld a judgment in favor of the executive.248 The court reasoned that, in
selling his shares, the plaintiff relied on the defendants’ assurances that he would
be the new corporate head, and the defendants never advised him to the contrary.249
“The making of the original statements, the discovery of their falsehood, and the
failure to correct them before plaintiff relied on them were ‘elements in a
continuing course of conduct’ capable of establishing fraud.”250
Similarly, when businesses tell their customers—through advertisements,
websites, or published privacy policies251—that their personal data is secure, but
then learn information to the contrary, the businesses may have a duty to disclose
those developments to their customers.252 The customers have a choice whether to
continue their relationships with the businesses in question. There has been no
irrevocable reliance by a customer, even though a business-customer relationship
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253.  See ROBERT L. DUNN, RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR FRAUD 20 (3d ed. 2003) (“[D]ozens of
cases are decided every year awarding economic loss damages for fraud.”); id. at 24–26 (discussing
cases that held the economic-loss rule does not apply to misrepresentation claims); see also id. at 20 (“If
the economic-loss rule is held to bar damages for misrepresentation, the courts are saying that there is
no difference between deliberate lying, that is, common-law fraud, and innocent sales of goods that
happen not to conform to the contract.”).
254.  See id. at 20 (“[O]nly a minority of states and a few federal courts have held the economic
loss rule applicable to fraud claims.”).
255.  See infra Part IV.A.
256.  See DUNN, supra note 253, at 18 (“There is no policy behind limiting the damages
recoverable against one who defrauds another to those damages that the party committing the fraud
might have been able to foresee at the time he or she made the misrepresentation.”).
257.  DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 483, at 1381 (2000) [hereinafter TORTS]. But see
DUNN, supra note 253, at 170 (“[C]ourts have divided sharply in recent years as to whether emotional
distress is a recoverable element of damages for fraud.”).
258.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965) (“(1) If the actor does an
act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of causing
physical harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking
effect. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies even though at the time of the act the actor has no
reason to believe that it will involve such a risk.”).
259.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005) (creating a duty to render assistance for conduct that creates a continuing risk of
harm, “even though not tortious”).
260.  Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 illus. 3 (1965) (indicating that a driver involved
in a accident because his car skids on ice has a duty to warn oncoming drivers).
is already in progress. The customers may act to protect their interests by
terminating the relationship and doing business elsewhere.
Importantly, in McGrath and similar cases, the defendants were not guilty of
mere negligence, but of fraud. In fraud actions, economic losses are routinely
recoverable,253 except in a minority of states.254 Consequently, if the law imposes
a duty to speak under this theory, the economic-loss rule255 or the usual
requirements of foreseeability may not limit the scope of liability.256 In addition,
“[e]motional harm damages are not ordinarily recoverable in a misrepresentation
action,”257 and thus the issues addressed in Part IV.B may be irrelevant under this
theory of liability.
3. Conduct Creating a Continuing Risk of Physical Harm
It is well established that when a person’s prior conduct creates a continuing
risk of physical harm there is a duty to render assistance to keep the harm from
occurring or mitigate adverse consequences.258 This duty exists even if the prior
conduct was not tortious.259 Thus, a driver who is involved in an auto accident must
stop to render assistance, regardless of whether he was at fault for the collision.260
Likewise, a landlord who sprays an apartment, carelessly or not, with a pesticide
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261.  See La Raia v. Superior Court, 722 P.2d 286, 287–90 (Ariz. 1986) (“Having caused or
contributed to plaintiff’s poisoning, defendant was under a duty to act reasonably to mitigate the
resulting harm.”).
262.  See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at 93 (“The predominant injury in a cybertort case is
a financial loss.”).
263.  816 A.2d 1001 (N.H. 2003).
264.  Id. at 1006.
265.  Id.
266.  Id. at 1007.
267.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 2005).
that makes a tenant ill is obliged, in response to a request, to disclose the pesticide’s
contents to aid the medical care of the tenant.261
The harm caused by intrusions into computerized personal data is typically
more economic than physical in nature.262 Yet, misuse of improperly accessed
personal data can result in a physical attack on a data subject or physical harm to
property. Hacking of a newspaper’s records, for example, may reveal when a
customer’s paper will be on “vacation hold” and thereby lead to a burglary while
the customer is away on vacation.
In Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc.,263 an Internet-based investigation service
obtained a woman’s workplace address not through hacking, but by placing a
pretext phone call and duping her into revealing her employment information.264
The party who purchased the data from the service then went to the workplace and
killed the woman.265 The court held that if an “information broker’s . . . disclosure
of information to a client creates a foreseeable risk of criminal misconduct against
a third person whose information was disclosed, the [information broker] owes a
duty to exercise reasonable care not to subject the third person to an unreasonable
risk of harm.”266 In cases like Remsburg, where access to personal data leads to
physical harm, hackers may have obtained the personal data from a third party,
thus potentially triggering the increased-risk-of-harm rule.
As articulated by the new Restatement (Third) of Torts, the existence of a duty
of reasonable care under this rule depends upon (1) “prior conduct,” that (2)
“creates a continuing risk of physical harm,” that is (3) “of a type characteristic of
the conduct.”267 When someone uses improperly accessed computerized data to
cause physical harm, the database possessor’s “prior conduct” is the maintenance
of the information in a form where one of the foreseeable risks is unauthorized
intrusion. That conduct may qualify as tortious (if the database possessor was
careless in safeguarding the data) or as innocent (if the database possessor exercised
reasonable care or was under no duty). The distinction makes no difference. The
loss of the data creates some risk of physical harm to data subjects—often not a
great risk, but not a negligible risk either. If the conduct and risk requirements are
satisfied, the question is then whether, if physical harm occurs, it is a type of harm
“characteristic of the conduct.” Concerning this requirement, the Restatement
commentary offers guidance:
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268.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 39 cmt. c (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005).
269.  Cf. Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required During Pre-Contractual
Negotiations, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 70, 127 (1993) (stating that a “party who owes [a] confidential
or fiduciary duty has an obligation to divulge or disclose during negotiations all material facts
concerning the transaction within his knowledge”).
270.  Cf. Candor, supra note 161, at 771 (stating that in legal representation a “duty of ‘absolute
and perfect candor’ applies most forcefully in instances where the interests of the attorney and client
are adverse”).
271.  There are difficult questions as to how far a fiduciary’s duty of candor extends.
Considerations relating to scope of the relationship, materiality, prior knowledge of the information,
competing obligations to others, consent, and likelihood of harm all act to limit the duty. See Candor,
supra note 161, at 778–92.  For a discussion of whether a lawyer must tell a client that the lawyer may
have committed malpractice, see id. at 773 & n.182.
The conduct must . . . be sufficiently connected with the potential
for later harm that imposing a duty to prevent or mitigate the harm
is appropriate. . . .  [I]t is unfair to impose this duty when the
actor’s conduct has not generally increased the risk of harm . . . or
is quite removed from the risks that pose harm to the other . . . .268
Whether a defendant’s practices in maintaining a database substantially
“increased the risk of harm” to the data subject, or are far “removed” from those
risks, are matters that depend heavily on the specific facts. In some cases, the
connection between the defendant’s role in the loss of the information and the
resulting threatened physical harm may be sufficiently great to give rise to a duty
to warn data subjects about breaches of the security of their personal information.
This theory of liability only applies in cases when data subjects suffer physical
harm. However, if data subjects suffer personal injuries, the amount of damages
may be great.
C. Fiduciary Duty of Candor
A fiduciary relationship imposes a duty of candor. The fiduciary must exercise
reasonable care to reveal all material information to the person to whom the
fiduciary owes a duty.269 Indeed, when the interests of the fiduciary and the
beneficiary are adversely aligned, fiduciary principles may require something more
than reasonable care—perhaps a degree of forthcomingness that approximates
“absolute and perfect candor.”270
If a database possessor owes fiduciary obligations to a data subject (as in the
case of an attorney and client), the possessor must disclose information relating to
a breach of database security. The interests of the fiduciary and the data subject are
in potential conflict because there are important questions as to whether the
possessor may be held responsible for the loss of the data. The law requires the
fiduciary to subordinate personal interests to the interests of the data subject.  Non-
disclosure would ordinarily be inconsistent with those heavy obligations.271
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272.  See supra Part II.D.
273.  John J. Laubmeier, Comment, Demystifying Wisconsin’s Economic Loss Doctrine, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 225, 225–26 (“[T]he application of the doctrine is a constantly developing area of law, which
may not be fully understood by judges, lawyers, or the public at large.”).
274.  See Ann O’Brien, Note, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam:  Preventing a Flood of Litigation
for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 959 (1989) (“Under the majority
rule, a plaintiff may recover economic losses for negligence only when there is accompanying physical
damage to person or property”); see also DUNN, supra note 253, at 19 (“In the last ten years or so, most
courts have held . . . economic loss unaccompanied by property damage or personal injury not to be
recoverable in an action alleging negligence or strict liability in the manufacture of a product . . . .”).
275.  See Rustad, supra note 3, at 113 (“The economic loss rule adopted by most courts is a barrier
to tort recovery for Internet-related security breaches.”).
276.  See JAY M. FEINMAN, ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE:  LIABILITY OF PROFESSIONALS AND
BUSINESSES TO THIRD PARTIES FOR ECONOMIC LOSS § 1.2, at 12 (1995) [hereinafter ECONOMIC
NEGLIGENCE] (stating that a “distinctive feature of economic negligence cases is the fear of
This theory of notification duty, like the earlier discussion of whether
fiduciaries have a duty to safeguard computerized personal information,272 has
limited applicability. This theory does not govern the general run of commercial
cases. However, this theory may be of great importance in cases involving lawyers,
physicians, and other fiduciaries who maintain computerized records containing
personal data relating to clients, patients, and beneficiaries.
IV. LIMITING CYBERSECURITY TORT LIABILITY
Assuming that a database possessor breached a duty to protect personal data or
to disclose information of unauthorized access to computerized information, how
far should tort liability extend? Should an affected data subject be able to recover
economic losses or emotional-distress damages that result from the breach? If these
or other substantial damages are ordinarily recoverable, is there anything the
defendant database possessor can do between the time of the breach and the
moment of harm to minimize its exposure to tort liability? The following subparts
consider these issues.
A. The Economic-Loss Rule
The economic-loss rule is an “‘obscure’”273 but important legal doctrine, which
holds that a plaintiff may not recover economic losses resulting from the
defendant’s negligence without corresponding physical damage to the plaintiff’s
person or property.274 Obviously, if the economic-loss rule applies to cybersecurity
cases, it has the potential to greatly limit the scope of recoverable damages.275
Consequently, it is important to understand the policies underlying the rule and the
precise nature of its restrictions. Viewed from the standpoint of public policy, the
economic-loss rule serves three very different functions: avoidance of too broad a
scope of liability; insistence that damages be proved with certainty; and definition
of the doctrinal boundary between contract law and torts.
First, somewhat crudely, the economic-loss rule protects potential defendants
from the risk of a disproportionately wide range of liability.276 This is an important
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indeterminate liability,” meaning both the “indeterminacy of the number of potential plaintiffs . . . and
the size of their claims”); id. § 1.3.2, at 16–19 (discussing the threat of indeterminate liability).
277.  See Bain v. Gillispie, 357 N.W.2d 47, 49 (Iowa Ct. App. 1984) (holding that injury to novelty
store owners’ business interests was not a reasonably foreseeable result of a college basketball referee’s
call that had the effect of eliminating the local team from the conference championship; no liability for
“referee malpractice”).
278.  Cf. Kinsman Transit Co. v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968) (denying recovery
to persons who incurred additional shipping costs when a bridge collapsed as a result of multiple acts
of negligence).
279.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1977) (“One is not liable to another for
pecuniary harm not deriving from physical harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor’s
negligently (a) causing a third person not to perform a contract with the other, or (b) interfering with
the other’s performance of his contract or making the performance more expensive or burdensome, or
(c) interfering with the other’s acquiring a contractual relation with a third person.”); see also id. § 766C
cmt. a (opining that courts “apparently have been influenced by . . . the fear of an undue burden upon
the defendant’s freedom of action, the probable disproportion between the large damages that might be
recovered and the extent of the defendant’s fault, and perhaps in some cases the difficulty of
determining whether the interference has in fact resulted from the negligent conduct”).
280.  ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE, supra note 276, § 1.3.2, at 18.
281.  Cf. J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 65 (Cal. 1979) (“The chief dangers . . . in allowing
recovery for negligent interference with prospective economic advantage are the possibility of excessive
liability, the creation of an undue burden on freedom of action, the possibility of fraudulent or collusive
claims and the often speculative nature of damages.” (emphasis added)).
282.  This is not the only occasion when the law employs a rather blunt rule to limit the scope of
tort liability. In some states, for example, there is no liability for negligent infliction of emotional
distress unless the plaintiff suffers some form of physical impact or physical consequences. See Brown
v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 801 P.2d 37, 45 (Idaho 1990) (holding that, absent physical manifestations
of injury, a son could not recover for distress allegedly resulting from mortuary’s negligent loss of the
cremated remains of his father); Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1221–22 (Ind. 2000) (indicating
that Indiana continues to adhere to a modified impact rule). 
function, for acts of negligence often have broad adverse economic consequences.
Without this protection, there would be no sensible stopping point to tort liability.
For example, a referee who negligently made a bad call that eliminated a team from
the playoffs could be liable for the lost profits of merchants who sell team-related
items,277 or a person who caused an auto accident could be responsible for all of the
economic losses that resulted from the delays of persons tied up in traffic.278 Not
surprisingly, the Restatement provides, as a general rule, that there is no liability for
negligent interference with contracts or economically promising relations.279
According to Professor Jay M. Feinman, “[I]ndeterminacy [of the scope of liability
in economic negligence cases] is a concern not in and of itself but through its
relation to fundamental tort policies. When liability is indeterminate, arguably the
deterrence, loss distribution, and fairness policies are undermined.”280
Second, lost economic opportunities are often not readily susceptible to precise
calculation.281 Yet, the law insists that damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty. By ruling out litigation in a huge range of cases (suits involving no
personal injury or property damage), the economic-loss rule helps to ensure (again
somewhat crudely282) that compensation is not awarded for amounts that are
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283.  But see DUNN, supra note 253, at 18–19 (“The rule that precludes recovery of uncertain and
speculative damages applies where the fact of damages is uncertain, not where the amount is
uncertain. . . . Computation of the amount is for the trier of fact.”).
284.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 7, 9 (“It has often been urged that . . . . [t]ort law
should be administratively convenient and efficient, and should avoid intractable inquiries. Only a
limited amount of resources can be devoted to the administration of justice in any society. This principle
holds that tort rules should be shaped so that the dollars spent on accident compensation are efficiently
employed. Thus, legal standards should not be so complex or uncertain that their application entails an
undue expenditure of judicial resources or imposes unnecessarily high litigation costs on parties. So,
too, convenience and efficiency discourage the pursuit of what might be called intractable inquiries,
matters where the facts are such that even after expenditure of considerable time and money, there is
a substantial risk that an erroneous result will be reached.”).
285.  See Doctrinal Classification, supra note 34; see also Daanen & Janssen, Inc. v. Cedarapids,
Inc., 573 N.W.2d 842, 846 (1998) (“Application of the economic loss doctrine to tort actions between
commercial parties is generally based on three policies, none of which is affected by the presence or
absence of privity between the parties:  (1) to maintain the fundamental distinction between tort law and
contract law; (2) to protect commercial parties’ freedom to allocate economic risk by contract; and (3)
to encourage the party best situated to assess the risk [of] economic loss, the commercial purchaser, to
assume, allocate, or insure against that risk.”); ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE, supra note 276, § 1.3.3, at
20–21 (discussing the protection of private ordering). 
286.  E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986); see generally
Vincent R. Johnson, Liberating Progress and the Free Market from the Specter of Tort Liability, 83
NW. U. L. REV. 1026, 1030 (1989) [hereinafter Liberating Progress] (stating that, according to one legal
commentator, “ever-more-generous incarnations of tort law ascended to the throne of accident
compensation following the decline of privity, the narrowing construction of disclaimers, and the widely
heralded ‘death of contract’” (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974))).
287.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 9 (noting that it has often been urged that the law
should be shaped to “promote individual responsibility” and to encourage persons “to employ available
resources to protect their own interests, rather than depend upon others to save them from harm”
(emphasis omitted)).
288.  476 U.S. 858 (1986); see also Glaub Jewelers, Inc. v. New York Daily News, 535 N.Y.S.2d
532, 534 (Civ. Ct. 1988) (holding that a newspaper that negligently failed to publish an advertisement
for a business was not liable in tort for the business’s lost sales).
speculative.283 In the process, the economic-loss rule promotes judicious use of
limited judicial resources, ensuring that those scarce assets are not squandered on
the burdensome, and perhaps dubious, task of trying to quantify endless economic
losses that may, in truth, not be provable with reasonable precision.284
Third, and most importantly, the economic-loss rule marks the boundary-line
between contract law and tort law.285 Delineating these two bodies of law is vital,
for otherwise there is a risk that “contract law would drown in a sea of tort.”286 The
law of contracts has meaning only because entering into an agreement has legal
consequences. One of those consequences is that if a person makes a bad deal, he
usually must suffer the result. This reality creates an incentive for contracting
parties to exercise diligence to protect their own interests.287 It would render
superfluous a great part of contract law if parties who strike disadvantageous
bargains could successfully complain that they should recover damages because the
other side failed to exercise reasonable care to protect their interests.
The best example of how the economic-loss rule distinguishes contract claims
from torts is East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,288 a case
involving a defective product. That suit, which eventually reached the nation’s
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289.  E. River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. at 860–61.
290.  Id.
291.  Id. at 861.
292.  Id. at 870.
293.  Id.
294.  E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871–72 (1986).
295.  Id. at 873.
296.  Presumably these costs would include items such as postage, phone calls, photocopying,
gasoline, and the like, as well as the cost of obtaining court documentation that one is the victim of
identity theft. Out-of-pocket costs may also include payments attributable to increased interest charges
on legitimate credit card expenditures that are assessed because the identity theft victim has a bad credit
rating. See Zeller, supra note 4, at C1 (stating, with regard to one identity theft victim, that “because
his credit rating had been severely damaged, the interest rates on some of Mr. Fairchild’s legitimate
cards began climbing, while the credit limits he had been extended on his cards suddenly began to
drop—even though his payments were on time”). Moreover, a financial institution or other entity may
sue the identity theft victim for a debt incurred by the identity theft perpetrator, and the victim may need
to spend money out of pocket to defend against those charges. See id. (describing an instance when “one
of many institutions that had bought and sold” a wrongfully incurred mortgage debt sued a victim of
identity theft who therefore “required the help of a lawyer”).
297.  See Stop Thieves, supra note 1, at 12 (stating that victims of identity theft “typically lose
$800 and spend two years clearing their names”).
298.  SENATE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. C.S.S.B. 122, 79th Leg. R.S.
(2005), available at Tx. B. An., S.B. 122, 4/7/2005 (Westlaw).
highest court, involved a defective component part of a turbine that damaged only
the turbine itself.289 There was no harm to any person or to the plaintiff’s “other”
property.290 The action sought damages in tort for the cost of repairs to the turbine
and for lost profits because statutes of limitations already barred the plaintiff’s
contract claims.291 The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Harry Blackmun,
held that a manufacturer has no tort duty under negligence or strict liability to
prevent a product from injuring itself.292 Those types of harm are merely economic
losses that parties can insure against or otherwise address while negotiating the
contract.293 Only product defects that result in harm to property other than the
product itself or in personal injury are cognizable under the law of torts.294 The law
of warranty provides sufficient protection for the benefits of the bargain.295
With these three policy considerations in mind—scope of liability, certainty of
damages, and delineation of contract-versus-tort—the question is then whether the
economic-loss rule should apply to cybersecurity cases and, if so, what claims for
damages the rule might bar. Answering those questions involves consideration of
the types of economic losses that may arise in these cases, as well as the efficacy
of contract law and the insurance market in addressing such losses. Unauthorized
use of personal information can result in many types of harm. In cybersecurity cases
where breaches of security result in identity theft, the losses include, but are not
limited to:  (1) out-of-pocket expenses incurred to restore a good credit rating; (2)
personal time spent on that task; and (3) lost opportunities resulting from bad credit.
Focusing first on out-of-pocket losses,296 there is little policy justification for
denying recovery. Various estimates currently peg out-of-pocket costs in a typical
case between $800297 and $1,400.298 Although the amount of out-of-pocket damages
may vary from case to case, this element of damages is susceptible to proof with a
300 SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  57: 255
299.  Indeed, if the database possessor had no legitimate reason for maintaining the personal
information of the data subject, a court may not relieve the possessor of exposure to liability.
300.  See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
301.  See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
302.  Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005, ch. 225, sec. 1, § 11-49.2-6(B), 2005 R.I.
Gen. Laws Adv. Legis. Serv. (LexisNexis), available at 2005 R.I. ALS 225 (LexisNexis).
303.  See Personal Information Protection Act, ch. 110, § 4-110-107, 2005 Ark. Legis. Serv.
(West), available at AR LEGIS 1526 (2005) (Westlaw) (“Any waiver of a provision of this subchapter
is contrary to public policy, void, and unenforceable.”); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.84(a) (West Supp.
2005); Personal Information Protection Act, Pub. Act 94-36, ch. 815, sec. 530, § 15, 2005 Ill. Legis.
Serv. (West), available at IL LEGIS 94-36 (2005) (Westlaw); Act of June 2, 2005, ch. 167, sec. 1, § 3,
2005 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at MN LEGIS 167 (2005) (Westlaw); Act of June 17,
2005, ch. 486, sec.17, § 27, 2005 Nev. Stat., available at NV LEGIS 486 (Westlaw); Act of May 10,
2005, ch. 368, § 9, 2005 Wash. Legis. Serv. (West), available at WA LEGIS 368 (2005) (Westlaw).
high degree of certainty. The plaintiff can gather receipts, make a list, and total the
sum. There is no reason to deny compensation for amounts actually and reasonably
spent on restoring a good credit rating on the ground that out-of-pocket damages
are speculative.
Nor does recovery of out-of-pocket costs present a case that requires a tightly
circumscribed circle of liability to prevent an over extension of legal responsibility.
In many cases, there will be  a business relationship between the database possessor
and the damaged data subject, and in other cases the relationship (presumably) is
sufficiently close enough that the defendant had some legitimate reason to maintain
a database containing personal information about the plaintiff.299 These are not
situations where some “stranger” in the community (e.g., the vendor of the losing
team’s products300 or the person tied up in traffic301) is seeking to recover damages.
If a database possessor wishes to constrict the scope of potential liability, it can
always do so by removing the personal information of data subjects from its
database. But if it fails to do so, courts should be reluctant to deny recovery of out-
of-pocket losses to data subjects. The database possessor chose to maintain personal
information in a form where one of the risks was unauthorized access.
If the scope of liability and uncertainty of damages are not significant
considerations, the only question, so far as the economic-loss rule is concerned, is
whether the boundary-line between contracts and torts creates a good reason for a
court to say this is the type of loss that should be compensated only if a contractual
obligation exists. The answer to that question is no.
An emerging consensus, reflected in the recently passed state security breach
notification statutes, suggests that rights relating to protection of personal data and
notification of security breaches are not proper subjects for bargaining between the
parties. Many state laws, such as the Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of
2005,302 provide that a waiver of the data subjects’ rights is against public policy,
and therefore void and unenforceable.303 If that is true, it makes little sense that
consumers should bargain and pay for the level of cybersecurity protection—and
the right to sue for out-of-pocket damages—that they desire. Moreover, it is simply
unrealistic to expect that bargaining to occur between individual consumers and the
large corporations that play a pervasive role in modern life. Individuals often lack
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304.  See Liberating Progress, supra note 286, at 1044 (discussing the “the inequalities of
bargaining power which pervade many consumer transactions” and noting that “[p]urveyors of goods
and services frequently employ standardized contracts which leave consumers little choice but to accept
a deal as presented—including contractual terms which purport to limit the provider’s liability to the
consumer”).
305.  Id. at 1042.
306.  Id.
307.  In contract law, consequential damages are not recoverable unless they were specifically in
the mind of the parties at the time the parties entered into the contract. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF
REMEDIES §§ 12.4(4)–4(6), at 779–89 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the “contemplation of the parties rule”).
Consequently, it would be difficult to recover out-of-pocket credit-repair damages under a contractual
theory of liability.
308.  Stop Thieves, supra note 1, at 12. “Policies generally cover the expenses of cleaning up the
crime, including attorney’s fees, costs of mailing correspondence, and lost wages. They seldom cover
the out-of-pocket loss to the victim . . . .” Id. at 14.
309.  See SENATE COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, BILL ANALYSIS, Tex. C.S.S.B. 122, 79 th Leg.
R.S. (2005), available at Tx. B. An., S.B. 122, 4/7/2005 (Westlaw). But see McMahon, supra note 4,
at 626 n.5 (“average victim spends 175 hours to clear name” (citing 147 CONG. REC. S12162 (daily ed.
Nov. 29, 2001) (statement of Ms. Cantwell))).
both the commercial leverage304 and the information necessary to assess the risks
they face. “[I]t would be entirely possible that despite good faith efforts and the
expenditure of considerable funds, a customer would fail to obtain a fully accurate
and complete picture of potential harms, with the result being an unintentional and
undesired assumption of risk by the consumer.”305 In light of the ubiquity of
computerized databases, ordinary persons would have to devote a huge amount of
energy to negotiating the parameters of data protection with every potential
defendant if contract law were the only solution to these types of problems. As a
result, “[c]onsumers would spend an inordinate amount of resources on efforts to
perform often duplicative, time-consuming tasks relating to assessment of the risks
of injury and the need for economic protection.”306
As an alternative to this sort of David-versus-an-army-of-Goliaths contractual
model, a better paradigm would routinely permit recovery of foreseeable and
necessary out-of-pocket losses from the tortfeasor. Compensation of out-of-pocket
losses should not depend upon whether the data subject read the fine print in the
defendant’s privacy policy or bargained for a specific level of protection. Instead,
compensation should depend on the reasonableness of the amount spent to restore
a good credit rating. Tort law can perform this function better than contract law.307
Moreover, the function is not one for which the insurance market has offered an
adequate substitute. According to Consumer Reports, “ID theft insurance is
typically not worth paying for.”308
The preceding analysis of the propriety of awarding out-of-pocket credit-repair
damages can be profitably contrasted with requests for recovery and compensation
for time spent restoring one’s good credit or for opportunities lost as a result of a
bad credit rating. Victims of identity theft spend six hundred hours on average to
restore their credit.309 The harm suffered by these victims is tremendous, but
valuing these lost hours would be difficult. If these damages amounted to
compensation for the plaintiffs’ time measured at their usual hourly rate of
earnings, the awards to professionals, minimum wage workers, and unemployed
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310.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 7 (“The proportionality principle seeks to limit or
refine application of the fault principle. In part, it holds that liability should not be levied on an
individual tortfeasor, even if fault is shown, if doing so would expose the defendant to a burden that is
disproportionately heavy or perhaps unlimited.”). The proportionality principle is one of the most
important forces in modern American tort law. To avoid imposition of disproportionate liability, courts
and legislatures have crafted limited-duty rules, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL HARM § 41 reporters’ note to cmt. g (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing the
sometimes-limited duties of mental-health professionals); imposed what amount to “standing to sue”
requirements, see Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co., 286 S.C. 579, 583, 336 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1985),
(stating that in bystander cases seeking recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress “the
plaintiff and the victim must be closely related”); restricted the types of damages that are recoverable,
see Rieck v. Medical Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 219 N.W.2d 242, 249–45 (Wis. 1974)
(denying recovery of child-rearing costs in failure-to-diagnose-pregnancy cases because that element
of damages would be “wholly out of proportion to the culpability involved”); embraced comparative
responsibility defenses, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 25
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing the defense in strict liability cases); and limited recovery
of damages to harm proximately caused, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
HARM ch. 6 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing the scope of liability).
311.  Cf. People v. Ware, No. H025167, 2003 WL 22120898, *1–2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2003)
(affirming an award of restitutionary damages, including an amount for the value of business hours the
victim spent repairing her damaged credit, because the legislature intended “‘that a victim of crime who
incurs any economic loss as a result of the commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from
any defendant convicted of that crime’”) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.4(a)(1) (West 1995)
(amended 2004)).
312.  “In the absence of physical damage, tort recovery for pure economic loss is limited to
‘wilful’ infliction of economic loss.” O’Brien, supra note 274, at 959–60 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON,
DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 129, at 1000 (5th ed. 1984)).
homemakers would vary widely—perhaps without good reason. Similarly, if every
victim received the same amount for the value of lost time, how would that amount
be set? Ensuring uniformity in valuing damages for lost time is a task better
committed to legislatures than to the multitude of fact-finders who will preside over
numerous tort claims.
The problems of compensating for the value of lost opportunities—such as the
lost chance to buy a house, obtain a car loan, or open a cell phone account—are
also obvious. How does one prove precisely which opportunities the plaintiff lost
and what those opportunities meant in economic terms to the plaintiff?  In addition,
there is a clear risk of imposing an excessively wide range of liability. Negligence
requires only a momentary misstep, whether in the data protection arena or in other
contexts. To say that a negligent database possessor should be liable to a broad
class of persons for all of their lost opportunities—as well as out-of-pocket and
perhaps other damages—would quickly pose a serious risk of liability
disproportionate to fault.310 These issues suggest that courts have a greater reason
to apply the economic-loss rule to bar claims for lost time and lost opportunities
than to hold that a plaintiff cannot recover out-of-pocket losses.
The economic-loss rule, as defined in most states, has important limits. First,
it bars only claims for economic harm caused bv negligence.311 A plaintiff may thus
be able to avoid the rule by proving more culpable conduct, such as recklessness
or intentional wrong-doing.312 Second, the economic-loss rule is a common law
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313.  See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
314.  See ECONOMIC NEGLIGENCE, supra note 276, § 1.2, at 11 (1995) (“The traditional view is
that personal injury is qualitatively different from economic loss because the former often has
catastrophic consequences for the victim and because monetary compensation is unable to wholly
remedy injury of this kind; therefore, negligence principles should be confined to cases of personal
injury. This view is now controversial; it has been challenged by the many courts that have applied
ordinary negligence principles to cases of economic loss . . . .”); CRITICAL INFORMATION
INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 50 (“Many courts . . . are beginning to reject the economic loss
doctrine. For example, in People Express Airline v. Consolidated Rail Corporation, the New Jersey
Supreme Court concluded that ‘a defendant who has breached his duty of care to avoid the risk of
economic injury to particularly foreseeable plaintiffs may be held liable for actual economic losses that
are proximately caused by its breach of duty.’” (quoting People Express Airlines, Inc. v. Consol. Rail
Corp., 495 A.2d 107, 118 (N.J. 1985)).
315.  See, e.g., Laubmeier, supra note 273, at 235–43 (discussing exceptions to the economic-loss
rule in Wisconsin).
316.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552B cmt. a (1977) (allowing recovery of out-of-
pocket losses resulting from negligent misrepresentation).
317.  See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161, 163 (Cal. 1969) (“An attorney who negligently fails
to fulfill a client’s testamentary directions incurs liability in tort for violating a duty of care owed
directly to the intended beneficiaries.” (emphasis added)), overruled on other grounds by Laird v.
Blacker, 828 P.2d 691, 698 (Cal. 1992).
318.  J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (“Where a special relationship exists
between the parties, a plaintiff may recover for loss of expected economic advantage through the
negligent performance of a contract although the parties were not in contractual privity.”).
319.  See JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 577 (“No area of tort law is more unsettled than
compensation for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The decisions continually restate the criteria
for recovery, and there are often substantial differences in the requirements, or their interpretation, from
one jurisdiction to the next, and within any one jurisdiction at different times.”).
doctrine that does not preempt legislative provisions to the contrary. Liability for
negligently caused economic harm may be actionable pursuant to statute. At least
one state, Illinois, expressly allows for recovery of economic losses in cybersecurity
cases.313 Third, many types of harm caused by intrusion are not purely economic.
Thus, the rule does not bar recovery of damages for personal injury, property
damage, and, perhaps, emotional distress. Fourth, some states show little
enthusiasm for the economic-loss rule314 and may determine that it does not apply
to cybersecurity cases. Finally, virtually all states that embrace the economic-loss
rule recognize some exceptions.315 For example, economic damages are routinely
recoverable in negligent misrepresentation actions.316 Many states allow persons
whose legacies are lost due to negligent preparation of a will to sue to recover those
economic damages.317 A court might determine the relationship between a database
possessor and data subject is sufficiently “special”318 to warrant recovery of out-of-
pocket losses resulting from identity theft—notwithstanding the economic-loss rule.
B. Emotional-Distress Damages
States differ tremendously over whether negligently caused emotional-distress
claims are actionable.319 Some jurisdictions hold that emotional-distress damages
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320.  Cf. Charles E. Cantu, An Essay on the Tort of Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress in
Texas:  Stop Saying It Does Not Exist, 33 ST. MARY’S L.J. 455, 465–68 (2002) (discussing the Texas
Supreme Court’s retreat from a broad interpretation of the tort).
321.  See generally Kimberly C. Simmons, Annotation, Recovery for Emotional Distress Based
on Fear of Contracting HIV or AIDS, 59 A.L.R. 5th 535, 549 (1998) (“Most often crucial to the success
of a claim is whether the particular jurisdiction or court required proof of actual exposure to a disease-
causing agent . . . .”).
322.  See Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (Ill. 1998) (holding that a complaint, alleging
that a dental student was infected with HIV at time he provided treatment to the plaintiffs, failed to state
a cause of action for fear of contracting AIDS absent proof that the patients were actually exposed to
HIV); K.A.C. v. Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Minn. 1995) (holding that a patient, who did not allege
that she was actually exposed to HIV, was not in the zone of danger and could not recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress); see also Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355, 1357 (Del. 1995) (holding
that “there can be no recovery for fear of contracting a disease in the absence of a showing that any of
the plaintiffs had suffered physical harm”). But see Temple-Inland Forest Prods. Corp. v. Carter, 993
S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex. 1999) (holding that workers who were exposed to asbestos, but who did not
currently have an asbestos-related disease, could not recover damages for fear of developing such a
disease in the future).
323.  See supra note 322 and accompanying text. But see Madrid v. Lincoln County Med. Ctr., 923
P.2d 1154, 1159 (N.M. 1996) (permitting recovery without actual exposure where the plaintiff came
into contact with bodily fluids that might have been, but were not, HIV-positive).
324.  JOHNSON & GUNN, supra note 38, at 579.
are almost never recoverable,320 but others seem quite willing to entertain claims for
psychic suffering caused by a tortfeasor’s failure to exercise due care.
One arena in which a consensus of sorts has emerged is the fear-of-disease
cases.321 In these suits, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant’s tortious conduct
subjected the plaintiff to emotional distress based on fear of contracting a
contagious disease. Many of these cases have involved fear of contracting HIV or
AIDS, but the precedent extends somewhat further to fear of cancer and other
diseases.
In addressing these claims, courts generally hold that a plaintiff may only
recover emotional-distress damages if the plaintiff was actually exposed to the
disease.322 Courts deem fear of disease in the absence of exposure to be
unreasonable and therefore not compensable.323
However:
[T]he critical question is whether “exposed” means (a) that the
defendant had the disease [when he or she came into contact with
the plaintiff], (b) that the circumstances were such that the disease
might have been transmitted, (c) that it is probable that the
plaintiff will develop the disease, or (d) that the plaintiff in fact
contracted the disease.324
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325.  Compare Johnson v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893–94 (W. Va. 1991)
(permitting recovery where the defendant hospital negligently failed to advise a security officer that an
unruly patient had AIDS, and the patient bit the officer after biting himself), with Potter v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 800 (Cal. 1993) (holding that “recovery of damages for fear of cancer
in a negligence action should be allowed only if . . . the fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by
reliable medical and scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not that the feared cancer will develop
in the future due to the toxic exposure”).
326.  See Henry K. Lee, Bay Area; Trail of Stolen Laptop Winds through Web:  Computer Had
Data for UC Berkeley Students, Alumni, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 16, 2005, at B1 (discussing recovery of a
stolen laptop where there was “no evidence of identity theft”).
327.  Ensslin, supra note 13, at 22A (explaining that the hackers had access to information about
42,900 persons).
328.  See S. Cent. Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749 So. 2d 95, 102 (Miss. 1999) (holding that if
“the defendant allowed or caused the best evidence [of exposure to HIV or another communicable
disease] to be destroyed, despite the fact that the defendant had notice that a material, factual issue
existed regarding that evidence, . . . a rebuttable presumption of actual exposure would arise in favor
of the plaintiff”).
329.  See, e.g., Russo v. White, 400 S.E.2d 160, 163 (Va. 1991) (allowing recovery only where
“distress . . . is so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it”).
330.  See Preston & Turner, supra note 26, at 459–60 (“Underreporting computer security
incidents is not limited to the U.S.—one European study estimates 30,000 to 40,000 occurred in one
European nation, while only 105 official complaints were made.” (citing COMM’N OF THE EUROPEAN
Courts have answered this question differently,325 yet the precedent that has
emerged in these cases provides a logical starting point for determining whether a
data subject should be able to recover for emotional-distress losses resulting from
unauthorized database intrusion and fear of identity theft or other harm. If there is
no evidence that an intruder actually accessed the plaintiff’s data, and the evidence
proves only a risk of unauthorized access,326 courts ordinarily should deny
emotional-distress damages, which are inherently difficult to quantify. For example,
in one case the evidence showed that “hackers appeared to have been more
interested in using . . . [a university’s] computer to download movies and music
than to access personal data.”327
In proving that the plaintiff’s personal data was subject to unauthorized access,
courts reasonably may employ a presumption of unauthorized access. If the
defendant has allowed or caused the best evidence of exposure to be lost or
destroyed, courts reasonably may assume that exposure occurred absent proof to the
contrary. Some fear-of-disease cases take this approach.328
In cases involving intentional infliction of emotional distress, courts have
assiduously required that the distress be severe before it is compensable.329 This
severity requirement is all the more applicable to cases where distress results from
mere alleged negligence. Presumably, in only rare cases will it be possible for a
data subject who does not suffer physical harm to recover emotional-distress
damages relating to data intrusion.
C. Security-Monitoring Damages
Database possessors who suffer a security breach are often reluctant to discover
and report those developments330 for fear of triggering adverse publicity, legal
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CMTY., PROPOSAL FOR A COUNCIL FRAMEWORK DECISIONS ON ATTACKS AGAINST INFORMATION
SYSTEMS 5 (2002))); Wible, supra note 16, at 1612 n.170 (stating that reluctance to report security
vulnerability in part reflects “a lack of faith in law enforcement”).
331.  See Marc S. Friedman & Kristin Bissinger, Infojacking:  Crimes on the Information
Superhighway, 9 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, 2 (1997) (“[O]rganizations often swallow losses quietly rather
than notifying the authorities and advertising their vulnerability to shareholders and clients.”).
332.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 35 (“[I]nformation in the
public domain about the vulnerability of a network could lead to copycat attacks.”); Wible, supra note
16, at 1578 n.6 (asserting that some companies fear that disclosure “both invites retributive attacks and
highlights vulnerabilities to other hackers”).
333.  See SENATE RULES COMM., BILL ANALYSIS, Cal. A.B. 700, 2001-2002 R.S. (2002), available
at CA B. An., A.B. 700 Sen., 8/22/2002 (Westlaw) (discussing hearings “to explore why the breach,
which reportedly occurred on April 5, 2002, was not discovered until May 7, 2002 and employees were
not notified until May 21, 2002”).
334.  See id. (discussing a case where “a former employee sold hundreds of financial records to
an identity theft ring but the company never told its customers”).
335.  See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
336.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 59 (“Disclosure is a
common vehicle for consumer protection . . . .”); Preston & Turner, supra note 26, at 460 (“[W]hen
consumers have notice of unauthorized access to their personal information, they can take steps to
mitigate the potential harm by informing credit reporting agencies and responding to fraudulent attempts
to exploit their good names.”).
337.  Interagency Guidance, supra note 239, at 15,752.
338.  Preston & Turner, supra note 26, at 460.
339.  See, e.g., Database Security Breach Notification Law, ch. 51, § 3074(A), 2005 La. Sess. Law
Serv. (West), available at LA LEGIS 499 (2005) (Westlaw) (mandating that a database possessor “shall,
following discovery of a breach . . . notify”); Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act, ch. 294,
sec. 2, § 48.103(b), 2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at 2005 TX LEGIS 294 (2005)
(Westlaw) (providing that businesses “shall disclose any breach . . . after discovering or receiving
notification of the breach”).
liability,331 or increased attacks by hackers.332 As a result, there is often an
undesirable lag between the occurrence of an intrusion, discovery of that breach,
and revelation of the events to data subjects.333 Indeed, sometimes database
possessors never tell data subjects about the breach.334 Yet, as noted above,335
revelation that a breach of security occurred enables data subjects to protect their
interests through increased vigilance against identity theft and other types of
harm.336
Notification can also be consistent with a database possessor’s own interests.
Timely notice to customers may protect a company’s reputation, reduce its risk of
legal liability, and minimize the chances of customer defections.337 “Requiring
businesses to disclose information security violations [also] provides operators with
a market incentive to ensure that their security is adequate.”338 
State security breach notification laws currently provide only a limited
incentive for database possessors to discover intrusion because legislatures
ordinarily base notification obligations on actual discovery or notification of the
intrusion rather than when the database possessor should have discovered the
breach.339 In addition, legislatures typically impose a low cap on the civil fines that
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340.  See, e.g., Identity Theft Enforcement and Protection Act, ch. 294, sec. 2, §§ 48.201(a), (e),
2005 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West), available at 2005 TX LEGIS 294 (2005) (Westlaw) (holding
violators “liable to the state for a civil penalty of at least $2,000 but not more than $50,000 for each
violation” and allowing the attorney general to recover “reasonable expenses . . . including reasonable
attorney’s fees, court costs, and investigatory costs”).
341.  Database Security Breach Notification Law, ch. 51, § 3072, 2005 La. Sess. Law Serv. (West),
available at LA LEGIS 499 (2005) (Westlaw).
342.  The database possessor should have the duty of proving that the data subject was notified
of the breach or that the possessor did everything reasonable to provide notice. This is especially true
when aggregate forms of communication are used to disclose security breaches to a large class of
persons.
343.  See, e.g., Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 824–25 (Cal. 1993) (“[T]he
cost of medical monitoring is a compensable item of damages where . . . the need for future monitoring
is a reasonably certain consequence of a plaintiff’s toxic exposure and . . . the recommended monitoring
is reasonable. In determining the reasonableness and necessity of monitoring, the following factors are
relevant:  (1) the significance and extent of the plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals; (2) the toxicity of the
chemicals; (3) the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in the exposed plaintiff as a result
of the exposure, when compared to (a) the plaintiff’s chances of developing the disease had he or she
not been exposed, and (b) the chances of the members of the public at large of developing the disease;
(4) the seriousness of the disease for which the plaintiff is at risk; and (5) the clinical value of early
detection and diagnosis.”); Askey v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 477 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y. App. Div.
1984) (allowing recovery of medical monitoring damages to “permit the early detection and treatment
of maladies [because] as a matter of public policy the tort-feasor should bear its cost”); Redland Soccer
Club, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Army, 696 A.2d 137, 145 (Pa. 1997) (finding “no reason to limit common law
medical monitoring claims to asbestos-related injuries”); Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522
S.E.2d 424, 429–31 (W. Va. 1999) (recognizing that a “cause of action exists . . . for the recovery of
medical monitoring costs”). But see Henry v. Dow Chem. Co., 701 N.W.2d 685, 689 (Mich. 2005)
(holding that medical monitoring was not a cognizable negligence claim absent physical injury); Badillo
v. Am. Brands, Inc., 16 P.3d 435, 441 (Nev. 2001) (“Nevada common law does not recognize a cause
of action for medical monitoring. A remedy of medical monitoring may be available for an underlying
cause of action but neither party . . . briefed the issue nor set forth the cause of action to which it would
apply to a breach of a general statutory duty to protect customer information, which
may provide insufficient inducement for best practices.340
Because “[v]ictims of identity theft must act quickly to minimize . . . damage”
and “expeditious notification of possible misuse of a person’s personal information
is imperative,”341 legislatures should give database possessors a legal incentive to
discover and report unauthorized database intrusions. That incentive could take the
form of a limitation on liability. One reasonable option would be to cap the
database possessor’s exposure to liability at the moment the database possessor
reveals the breach to the data subject.342 Notification could serve as the pivotal
factor in shifting further responsibility (beyond the damages cap) from the database
possessor to the data subject. Once the database possessor provides notice of the
security breach, the data subject is in a better position than the database possessor
to monitor the risk of harm and to take action against threats to the data subject’s
credit and personal security.
The cap on damages could take the form of limiting liability to an amount
equivalent to the out-of-pocket costs of monitoring security and taking reasonably
necessary steps to prevent identity theft and other losses. These “security-
monitoring damages” would be similar in concept to the medical monitoring
damages that some state343 and federal344 courts allow victims of toxic exposure to
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provide a remedy.”); Theer v. Philip Carey Co., 628 A.2d 724, 733 (N.J. 1993) (holding that an asbestos
worker’s wife, who was indirectly exposed to the product, could not recover medical surveillance
damages).
344.  See, e.g., Carey v. Kerr-McGee Chem. Corp., 999 F. Supp. 1109, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(predicting that “the Illinois Supreme Court would uphold a claim for medical monitoring”);
Witherspoon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 455, 467 (D.D.C. 1997) (recognizing medical
monitoring damages under District of Columbia law, but finding that the plaintiff failed to prove
“present injury and a reasonable fear that the present injury could lead to the future occurrence of
disease”); see also MARTIN A. KOTLER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND BASIC TORT LAW 328 (2005) (stating
that the issue has been “considered by a significant number of state courts and federal courts applying
or predicting state law and, while it is generally recognized that monitoring expenses are a recoverable
item of damages if an actionable tort is established, many courts have concluded that they are not
otherwise recoverable as an independent claim”).
345.  See Stollenwerk v. Tri-West Healthcare Alliance, No. 03-0185PHXSRB, 2005 WL 2465906,
at *3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2005) (“The Court is not convinced that the negligent exposure of confidential
personal information is entirely dissimilar from negligence exposure to toxic substances or unsafe
products.”); see also People v. Ware, No. H025167, 2003 WL 22120898, *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 11,
2003) (affirming an award of restitutionary damages to a victim of identity theft, including “$100 per
year for monitoring the adverse consequences on her credit rating”).
346.  Stollenwerk, 2005 WL 2465906, at *3.
347.  Id.
348.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452 cmt. f (1965) (discussing the shifting
of responsibility to a third person).
349.  In some cases, a contractual or statutory allocation of responsibilities between multiple
parties is important. See Goar v. Vill. of Stephen, 196 N.W. 171, 174 (Minn. 1923) (holding that the
duty to prevent harm shifted from a power company that negligently installed electrical lines to a village
that negligently inspected and maintained the lines, because the village had contractually assumed those
obligations); First Assembly of God, Inc. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 52 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Tex. App. 2001)
(holding that where a statutory tariff provided that “the church ‘assumes full responsibility for electric
energy furnished to customer at and past the point of delivery,’” a utility “did not have a duty to check
equipment downstream to insure it was installed and maintained properly”); Braun v. New Hope Twp.,
646 N.W.2d 737, 743 (S.D. 2002) (holding that the responsibility to prevent a motorist’s injuries shifted
from farmers who broke a warning sign to a township that had a statutory duty to erect guards and
maintain warning signs). In other cases, the determination is a result of a number of factors, such as “the
degree of danger and the magnitude of the risk of harm, the character and position of the third
person . . . his knowledge of the danger and the likelihood that he will or will not exercise proper care,
his relation to the plaintiff or to the defendant, and the lapse of time.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 452 cmt. f (1965). In some cases, the courts seem to implicitly ask whether the defendant did
everything reasonable to prevent the harm from occurring. See, e.g., Balido v. Improved Mach., Inc.,
105 Cal. Rptr. 890, 902–04 (App. Ct. 1973) (refusing to hold that the responsibility to prevent a
recover. The analogy is apt, as at least one court has found.345 A data subject who
loses personal data due to a security breach, like a person who suffers exposure to
a toxic substance, is at risk of further harm.346 The harm (e.g., identity theft in the
case of the data subject or cancer in the case of the toxic-exposure victim) may or
may not later occur.347 However, the reasonable and prudent course is to incur the
expenses necessary to monitor the risk that harm may develop. The victim of the
exposure is thereby in a better position to take prompt action—in one case, to
combat the risk of financial harm and other risks from data misuse, and in the other,
to secure medical care to address the risk of developing an illness.
The concept of shifting responsibility is not new to the law.348 Some cases hold
that a party who creates a risk is not a proximate cause of harm that later occurs.349
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defective machine from causing harm shifted from the manufacturer, who offered to repair the machine
for $500, to the subsequent owner who refused the offer); see also Kent v. Commonwealth, 771 N.E.2d
770, 778 (Mass. 2002) (holding that a board’s decision to parole a violent inmate pursuant to an INS
deportation warrant shifted the duty to prevent harm from the parole board to the INS).
350.  See supra note 237.
351.  See supra note 238.
352.  The federal government says that victims of data intrusion should “remain vigilant over the
next twelve to twenty-four months.” Interagency Guidance, supra note 239, at 15,753. In some states,
the applicable statute of limitations for negligence might be two years, depending on the nature of the
claim. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a)–(b) (Supp. 2005) (stating that a two-
year limitation applies to certain claims for personal injury, property damage, and wrongful death).
353.  See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 448 (1965) (discussing whether
intentionally tortious or criminal conduct breaks the chain of causation).
354.  See supra Parts IV.A and B.
355.  See supra Part II.
356.  See Eric Dash, From Data Holders, Lots of Reassurance, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2005, at C6
(discussing a television advertisment highlighting “Citigroup’s free identity theft protection services,
which include fraud detection warnings on every bank and credit card account”); McCoy, supra note
45, at 490–91 (stating that, upon learning of the theft of laptops containing customer information in
November 2003, Wells Fargo notified the affected customers and “promised to monitor the at-risk
accounts, change the affected account numbers, add a Credit Alert report to customers’ credit reports,
In these cases, the responsibility for preventing the harm has shifted from the
original tortfeasor to someone else. While the law typically shies away from the
rubric of “shifting responsibility,” there are many instances where tort law has
embraced the idea in substance, sometimes dressed in the garb of “duty.” The rules
in some states, mentioned earlier, that say that a possessor of land need do nothing
more than warn a licensee of known dangers,350 or that a mental health professional
treating a dangerous patient need only warn the victim or the police,351 are rules
that, in effect, shift the burden of preventing harm from one party to another once
a warning is given.
The bargain of capping a cybersecurity plaintiff’s damages at the cost of
monitoring security if the database possessor provides notification of a security
breach is not a bad one. From the standpoint of the data subject, the plaintiff may
be better off with a warning and reimbursement for the out-of-pocket costs of
vigilance than gambling on a tort action against the database possessor. A tort suit
would be fraught with many obstacles:  a possibly short statute of limitations352 if
the intruder does not quickly exploit the improperly accessed data; a risk that the
court will not find the database possessor’s negligence to be a proximate cause of
resulting criminal conduct;353 a likelihood that the economic-loss or “exposure”
rules may bar key portions of the damages;354 and a possibility that the court might
find that the database possessor had no duty at all.355
Nor is the bargain bad for database possessors. Capping damages at the cost of
security monitoring would avoid the risk of catastrophic liability for personal
injuries that sometimes occur, the possibility of exposure to property-damage
claims, and the chance that a court might narrowly construe the applicability of the
economic-loss rule. Some companies faced with the risk of liability from loss of
personal data have voluntarily provided affected persons with security-monitoring
protection.356
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provide 24-hour access to specially trained account representatives, and provide a one-year membership
to a credit-monitoring reporting service so customers could quickly learn if any of their information was
being misused”); cf. Reddick, supra note 15, at 4 (noting that nine states require businesses to notify
consumer-reporting agencies of security breaches).
357.  See CRITICAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE, supra note 16, at 65–66 (describing available
coverage and noting that “[t]he paucity of data on cyberrelated losses makes it difficult to accurately
price cyberinsurance policies”).
358.  See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Medical Monitoring—Should Tort Law Say Yes?, 34 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1057, 1059 (1999) (“[T]he inherent complexities and significant public policy concerns
surrounding medical monitoring awards, which were noted by the United States Supreme Court in
Metro-North, suggest that the issue ought to be decided by legislatures, not by courts.” (citing Metro-
North Commuter R.R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 441–44 (1997))).
Moreover, society would be better off if the law capped damages at the cost of
security monitoring in exchange for victim notification whenever there is a security
breach. The only ways to minimize the losses stemming from database intrusions
(aside from criminal penalties, which seem ineffective) are to spur investment in
data security, to discover when intrusions occur, and to warn persons whose
interests are at risk. A cap on damages in exchange for notification of security
breaches would not undercut the database possessors’ incentives to invest in data
security. Database possessors would still be subject to state and federal laws that
impose various sanctions relating to cybersecurity; they would still face the threats
of bad publicity and consumer disaffection resulting from disclosure of security
breaches; and at least some possessors (e.g., credit card companies) would still
stand to lose millions of dollars as a result of fraudulent use of personal
information. However, capping damages at security-monitoring costs would help
to ensure that database possessors are not subject to ruinous tort judgments. The cap
would create incentives to discover security breaches and to internalize the resulting
security-monitoring costs that those intrusions entail. Consumers would also be
better able to protect their own interest in the variety of ways discussed above. In
addition, the cap on damages might also reduce the threat of overburdening already
overworked federal and state courts. The cap would greatly simplify damages issues
in cybersecurity cases and guidance from the courts would quickly define the
average costs of security monitoring, thereby promoting the settlement of cases.
Indeed, limiting liability to security-monitoring damages is also likely to promote
insurance coverage of intruder-related losses by making the extent of liability more
certain, thereby facilitating the pricing of insurance coverage.357
A damages cap should not apply to cases involving egregious conduct. A
plaintiff who can establish that the defendant acted with reckless indifference or
intentional disregard in failing to protect data should be able to avoid the limitation
on liability. Similarly, if the defendant did not disclose a security breach, liability
for a breach of the notification duty or of the duty to protect data should extend as
far as the usual rules of tort law allow.
A cap on database possessor liability at the costs of security-monitoring
damages can be legislatively enacted.358 However, in the absence of legislation to
the contrary, questions relating to duty, proximate causation (including shifting
responsibility), and damages have traditionally been in the province of the courts.
Quite possibly, state law may permit the courts to determine that if a database
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possessor negligently fails to protect computerized personal information, the
database possessor has no legal obligation other than to pay for security-monitoring
damages if the database possessor revealed the breach to the data subject.
V. CONCLUSION:  SECURITY IN INSECURE TIMES
Modern society is built on fragile foundations of computerized personal data.
If this society is to endure and prosper, then it must vigilantly safeguard those
foundations. Tort law offers an appropriate legal regime for allocating the risks and
spreading the costs of database intrusion-related losses. Tort law can also create
incentives, on the part of both database possessors and data subjects, to minimize
the harm associated with breaches of database security. Courts and legislatures must
consider carefully the role of tort liability in protecting computerized data. If those
who make and interpret the laws too hastily conclude that database possessors are
not liable for losses occasioned by unauthorized data access—whether because
there is no duty, no proximate causation, or no recoverable damages—important
opportunities to reduce and distribute the costs of computerized technology will be
lost. If liability is too readily assessed, important institutions will be adversely
affected, and with them the prosperity of modern society. Security in insecure times
requires a sensitive balancing of competing interests. Established tort principles
carefully applied to the contemporary problems of cybersecurity and identity theft
can perform a key role in protecting the economic foundations of modern life.
*
